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WHAT’S IN A NAME? HOW NATIONS DEFINE TERRORISM
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11
SUDHA SETTY*
ABSTRACT
Ten years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, it almost goes
without saying that the acts of grotesque violence committed on
that day have had enormous effects on national security law and
policy worldwide. To be labeled a terrorist, or to be accused of
involvement in an act of terrorism, carries far more severe
repercussions now than it did ten years ago. This is true under
international law and under domestic law in nations that have
dealt with serious national security concerns for many years.
Given the U.N.’s global mandate to combat terrorism and that
being defined as a terrorist can have widespread legal implications,
this Article seeks to address how legal definitions are shaped and
analyzes the lack of a globally accepted definition of terrorism in
the context of domestic counterterrorism obligations. This Article
addresses a significant historical gap in examining the interplay
between international obligations and domestic definitions, the
previously overlooked history and evolution of those definitions,
and the potential rule of law issues arising from the definitions in
their current form.
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In examining counterterrorism law in the United States, the
United Kingdom, and India, it is clear that definitions of terrorism
under various domestic laws have been repurposed from one
legislative context to another and broadened in application,
particularly since September 11. This has led to the arguably
unintended consequences of disparate impact on outsider groups
and the unmooring from rule of law principles. Since neither
international norms nor domestic courts provide a significant
check against creeping definitions, legislatures must take proactive
steps to combat potential overreaching in applying the label of
terrorism.
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INTRODUCTION

As we reflect on the ten-year anniversary of the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, it is clear that the last decade witnessed a
transformation of the landscape of national security law and
policy, both domestically and internationally. Soon after the
September 11 attacks, the United Nations Security Council took a
bold, novel step in mandating worldwide domestic lawmaking to
combat terrorism,1 despite the seemingly central problem that the
United Nations has not adopted a comprehensive definition of
terrorism.2
In the United States and other nations, being labeled a terrorist
carries different consequences—ranging from trial in a specialized
court3 to a delay in or denial of access to counsel and other pretrial
constitutional protections,4 restrictions on freedom of expression,5
1 See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) [hereinafter S.C.
Res. 1373] (mandating that all U.N. member nations take proactive steps to
combat terrorism, including increasing criminalization and implementing harsher
sentencing for terrorist acts, freezing funds of those financing terrorist acts,
sharing intelligence information with other member nations, and tightening
border controls to prevent the migration of terrorists). See generally Kim Lane
Scheppele, Other People’s Patriot Acts: Europe’s Response to September 11, 50 LOY. L.
REV. 89, 91–92 (2004) (detailing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 which
mandated that countries institute laws combating terrorism and noting the lack of
consensus on the scope of the definition of terrorism).
2 See S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 3 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (attempting to
more clearly set forth the parameters of terrorism in light of the lack of a
comprehensive United Nations definition).
3 See generally Sudha Setty, Comparative Perspectives on Specialized Trials for
Terrorism, 63 ME. L. REV. 131 (2010) (detailing the uses and limitations of
specialized trials for terrorism, as well as comparative perspectives from the
United Kingdom, Israel, and India).
4 For example, in May 2010, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder suggested
that Congress consider legislation to expand and define the public safety
exception articulated in N.Y. v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). Quarles held that the
obligation of law enforcement officers to inform arrestees of their right to counsel,
among other Miranda rights, was subject to a public safety exception under
certain circumstances. Holder’s proposed legislation would provide for a “broad
new exception to the Miranda rights” which would permit “investigators to
interrogate terrorism suspects without informing them of their rights.” Charlie
Savage, Holder Backing Law to Restrict Miranda Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2010, at
A1.
5 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010)
(holding constitutional under the First Amendment a Patriot Act provision which
made it unlawful to provide material support and assistance to organizations
deemed terrorists, even where such support was nonviolent).
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or weakened constitutional protections of privacy rights in the
home.6 In countries facing serious national security threats, the
label of terrorism can have a deep and meaningful effect on those
deemed to be “terrorists” and on counterterrorism law and policy
as a whole.
Given the U.N.’s global mandate to combat terrorism and that
defining an individual as a terrorist has widespread legal
implications, this Article seeks to address numerous questions.
How do definitions of terrorism differ among nations dealing with
serious national security threats? How are these legal definitions
shaped and how does the labeling of a person or entity as a
terrorist affect them differently than if they were treated as an
“ordinary” criminal suspect? What is the impact of the lack of a
globally accepted definition of terrorism at the U.N. level
combined with worldwide mandates that are predicated on a
working definition of terrorism?
Countries facing serious national security threats face the same
threshold questions of how to define terrorism and the
implications of those definitions. After the adoption of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1373,7 even countries that
generally treated acts of terrorism as ordinary criminal matters8
were moved to define terrorism, if only to comply with Resolution
1373’s mandate that countries provide details of their

6 See, e.g., discussion infra Section 3.2.2 (discussing control orders in the
United Kingdom, which restrict suspected terrorist’s movements to and from the
home).
7 See S.C. Res 1373, supra note 1, ¶ 3 (calling upon states to cooperate with one
another to suppress terrorist acts).
8 See e.g., Nicholas Kulish, Suspects Plan Guilty Pleas in Terror Case in Germany,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
9,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10
/world/europe/10germany.html?src=twt&twt=nytimes (reporting that four
suspects, accused of membership in terrorist organizations and of plotting
bombings in Germany, planned to plead guilty to terrorism charges); 14 Terror
Suspects to Go Straight to Trial, CTV NEWS, Sept. 24, 2007,
http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Canada/20070924/terror_trial_070924 (reporting
on the upcoming trial of fourteen “terror suspects accused of plotting to storm
Parliament and behead Prime Minister Stephen Harper”); Turkey: Life in Prison for
6
Al-Qaida
Suspects,
SEATTLE
TIMES,
June
10,
2009,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009321775_apeuturkeyal
qaidatrial.html (reporting that a Turkey appellate court upheld life sentences of
six “al-Qaida militants” and lesser sentences of 33 for their 2003 involvement in
fatal bombings of synagogues, a bank, and a British consular office).
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counterterrorism programs.9 Nations facing serious national
security issues, including the United States, United Kingdom, and
India, increased the robustness of their counterterrorism efforts in
the wake of Resolution 1373.10 These nations faced mixed results in
terms of efficacy, preservation of rights, benefits to national
security, adherence to the rule of law, and public confidence in
institutional legitimacy.
The United Kingdom and India, nations with different
structural systems and histories of dealing with internal and
external violence than the United States, are nonetheless
particularly useful comparators in this analysis. All three nations
share a legal heritage and the burden of serious national security
threats. Beyond that, however, these nations enjoy relatively
strong and stable governance structures, a separation of powers
and political process that has supported challenges to securityrelated decision-making, and a relatively high level of
transparency with regard to the operation of legal mechanisms. As
such, the experiences of the United Kingdom and India offer useful
insight as to how legal definitions of terrorism have undergone
remarkably similar evolutions despite different historical contexts,
thereby making this comparative analysis all the more relevant for
consideration of potential domestic reforms.11
9
See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 1, ¶ 6 (calling upon states to disclose the
steps they have taken to implement Resolution 1373).
10 It is widely understood that the adoption of Resolution 1373 was largely
due to U.S. pressure on the members of the United Nations Security Council. See
Kim Lane Scheppele, The Constitutional Role of Transnational Courts: Principled Legal
Ideas in Three-Dimensional Political Space, 28 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 451, 455 (2010)
(“It is no coincidence that UN Security Council Resolution 1373, passed on 28
September 2001, mirrors almost exactly the strategy for fighting terrorism that one
sees in the USA PATRIOT Act, which the US was drafting at the same time as it
was urging the Security Council to act.”).
11 In recent years, the U.S. government has been willing to consider and
possibly adopt counterterrorism laws and policies from other countries when
those tactics are perceived to be successful. See, e.g., Catching Terrorists: the British
System Versus the U.S. System: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on
Appropriations, 109th Cong. 2–29 (2006) (statements of Hon. Richard A. Posner,
Fed. J., Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; John Yoo, Professor of Law, Boalt
Hall Sch. of Law, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley; Tom Parker, CEO, Halo Partnership
Consulting, Former British counterterrorism official (commenting on the
measures Britain has taken in combating terrorism). Judge Posner noted his
enthusiasm for engaging in comparative national security policy analysis:

We must not be too proud to learn from nations such as the United
Kingdom that have a much longer history of dealing with serious
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Section 2 of this Article considers the challenges of relying on
an incomplete and piecemeal definition of terrorism at the United
Nations level in conjunction with the mandate for robust
counterterrorism measures in United Nations member states.
Section 3 examines from a comparative perspective how the
United States, United Kingdom, and India have developed their
current legal definitions of terrorism and how those definitions are
applied by the government and law enforcement in each nation.
By examining the history and application of these definitions, we
can understand the value judgments and policies each of these
nations promote as they combat terrorism domestically and
comply with international obligations.
Section 4 analyzes the interplay between domestic definitionbuilding and the policies and values promoted both by the various
legal definitions of terrorism and the obligations under United
Nations Resolution 1373. This Part also considers what lessons can
be drawn from the experience of these nations grappling with
similar foundational questions of defining terrorism and creating
bases for national security law and policy.
2.

THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM OF DEFINING
TERRORISM

The quest to establish a universal definition of terrorism is
entangled in questions of law, history, philosophy, morality, and
religion.12 Many scholars believe that the definitional question is,
terrorist threats than the United States has. . . . The United Kingdom is a
particularly apt model for us to consider in crafting our counterterrorist
policies because our political and legal culture is derivative from
England’s.
Id. at 4. I suggest that such engagement in comparative national security policy
analysis can be quite useful when contextualized in the historical and legal
experiences of each nation.
12 In this Article I do not attempt to offer a new, different, or comprehensive
definition of terrorism, as that task has been undertaken with great effort by many
other scholars. See, e.g., BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 13–44 (Columbia Univ.
Press, 1998) (describing the fluidity of terrorism’s definition throughout history
and concluding by defining terrorism in contemporary terms as “the deliberate
creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in
pursuit of political change”); Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal
Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 249–50
(2004) (examining “twenty-two definitions or descriptions of terrorism and
related terms in federal law” and advocating an alternative, all-inclusive legal
definition of terrorism); Alex Schmid, Terrorism—The Definitional Problem, 36 CASE
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by nature, a subjective one that eludes large-scale consensus.13
Indeed, one scholar has opined: “tell me what you think about
terrorism, and I tell you who you are.”14 This may be true—it may
ultimately be a futile project to define terrorism from a moral or
philosophical perspective. However, by nature, counterterrorism
law and policy depends on definition. If the international
community or any individual state is to address the problem of
terrorist activity, it must first define terrorism’s parameters. This
foundational question is of the utmost importance in determining
who a state or international body will consider a terrorist and,
therefore, who will be subject to the stricter laws, diminished rights
protections, and harsher penalties that are concomitant with the
designation of “terrorism.”
2.1. The United Nations’ Inability to Define Terrorism
Comprehensively
The lack of a comprehensive and universally accepted
definition of terrorism has been an ongoing obstacle to
constructing a unified global stance against terrorism and, on a
more practical level, in concretizing the meaning, implementation,
and effect of United Nations resolutions and international treaties
involving counterterrorism issues.15 Some scholars have suggested
that the absence of a universal definition has hindered
counterterrorism operations and limits the effectiveness of both
international and domestic lawmaking efforts to counter terrorist
activity while maintaining the rule of law and fulfilling human
rights obligations.16
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 375 (2004) (emphasizing the importance of developing a
common international definition of terrorism and attempting to provide for an
operative definition).
13 See e.g., Perry, supra note 12, at 252 (positing that terrorism’s “lack of
definitional consensus” most likely stems from the word’s negative judgmental
associations); Schmid, supra note 12, at 396 (indicating that it would be difficult to
reach a universal consensus on the definition of terrorism because any definition
would shaped by one’s ideological biases or political preferences).
14 See Schmid, supra note 12, at 396 (quoting U.S. historian J. Bowyer Bell).
15 See id. at 378–80 (discussing the international challenges of fighting
terrorism absent an agreed-upon definition).
16 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism [hereinafter U.N. Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights], ¶¶ 26–27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/98 (Sept. 28,
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To some extent, the international community has managed to
work around the lack of a comprehensive definition through the
adoption of various international treaties, Security Council
resolutions, and United Nations protocols addressing international
terrorism and the obligation of states to use robust
counterterrorism measures.17 However, lack of a uniform and
universally accepted definition, coupled with a mandate for strong
counterterrorism laws and policies, has opened the door for
potential abuse by member states in those areas in which the
piecemeal international definition does not provide clarity. This
potential for abuse has only been partially ameliorated by recent
efforts of the Security Council to ensure member states’ adherence
to human rights obligations and to increase transparency in the
process of designating terrorist organizations.18
The United Nations has attempted to establish an
internationally accepted definition of terrorism numerous times
2005) (Martin Scheinin) (proposing that the lack of a concrete definition of
terrorism results in unaddressed terrorist acts and may sometimes encourage
states to commit unjustifiable abuses under the pretext of combating terrorism);
see also Schmid, supra note 12, at 379 (describing ways in which the lack of a
definition of terrorism renders it difficult to carry out effective counterterrorist
policies in the international realm). Others have suggested that certain countries,
including the United States, have leveraged the ambiguity of the definition of
terrorism to promote hegemonic foreign policy objectives by setting up an
objective of defeating “terrorism” without being limited by a particular definition
of what they are opposing. See generally Alexander J. Marcopoulos, Terrorizing
Rhetoric: The Advancement of U.S. Hegemony Through the Lack of a Definition
of
‘Terror’,
(Jan.
2009)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=alexander
_marcopoulos (arguing that the United States has taken liberty with the ambiguity
inherent in terrorism’s definition in order to advance its own hegemonic
objectives).
17 See Schmid, supra note 12, at 391–92 (remarking that interpreting the
existing body of universal conventions and protocols together as an aggregate
whole might provide a useful framework for loosely defining terrorism).
18 The Special Rapporteur noted that:
Calls by the international community to combat terrorism, without
defining the term, can be understood as leaving it to individual States to
define what is meant by the term. This carries the potential for
unintended human rights abuses and even the deliberate misuse of the
term. Besides situations where some States resort to the deliberate
misuse of the term, the Special Rapporteur is also concerned about the
more frequent adoption in domestic anti-terrorism legislation of
terminology that is not properly confined to the countering of terrorism.
U.N. Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, supra note 16, ¶ 27.
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since the 1960s.19 The General Assembly repeatedly resolved to
create a universally agreed upon definition. In this vein, a 1987
resolution noted that “the effectiveness of the struggle against
terrorism could be enhanced by the establishment of a generally
Each effort,
agreed definition of international terrorism.”20
however, failed based on the perceived subjectivity of any such
definition,21 as certain elements of a proposed definition were
rejected by various nations whose interests were not served.22
Some nations emphasized the need to except freedom fighting,
anti-colonial uprisings, or other related violence from the
definition of terrorism.23 Other nations focused on the desire to
19 The search for a supranational definition of terrorism dates at least back to
1937, when the League of Nations considered the Convention for the Prevention
and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov. 16, 1938, 19 League of Nations O. J. 23.
Article 1(2) of the proposed Convention defined terrorism as “criminal acts
directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the
minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public.” Id. art.
1(2). See also Schmid, supra note 12, at 385 (noting that the proposed definition for
terrorism was neither adopted by the League of Nations nor later considered for
adoption by the U.N. at its founding). In a similar vein to Resolution 1373, many
of the remaining Articles of the proposed League of Nations Convention called for
Member States to criminalize various acts that constitute or support terrorism and
to share information with other Member States to strengthen counterterrorism
operations.
20 G.A. Res. 42/159, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/159 (Dec. 17, 1987).
This
resolution emphasized the importance of combating terrorism, but also
recognized the need to do so in a manner that protects human rights and
recognizes the right to self-determination for oppressed peoples. Id. ¶¶ 8, 14.
21 See HOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 31 (noting that “the decision to call someone
or label some organization ‘terrorist’ becomes almost unavoidably subjective,
depending largely on whether one sympathizes with or opposes the
person/group/cause concerned”).
22 The General Assembly created an ad hoc committee to create an
international convention on the prevention of terrorist violence. See G.A. Res.
51/210, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996) (establishing an ad hoc
group to address terrorist bombings, “and thereafter to address means of further
developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with
international terrorism”). Although the ad hoc committee has made significant
progress in developing a comprehensive convention, efforts at the foundational
question of defining terrorism have stalled the process. See U.N. Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, supra note 16, ¶ 29 (reporting that disagreement over
the definition of “terrorist offenses” within the ad hoc group remained as the
primary issue preventing a final draft convention on terrorism).
23 See Schmid, supra note 12, at 386 (noting disagreement at the U.N. ad hoc
committee between member nations negotiating the definition of terrorism, with
some members arguing for a distinction between freedom-fighting and terrorism).
Political actors have argued that this type of anti-occupation violence—
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exclude state-sponsored actions from definitions of terrorism.24 On
one hand, inability to reach consensus on the definition of
terrorism reflects an ideological split and a reluctance of certain
states to conform to the outlook and agenda of politically powerful
nations.25 On the other hand, because most definitions include
common core elements, such as a condemnation of the purposeful
particularly when considered in the historical perspective of revolutionary
movements—should be treated by law and international policy as distinct from
terrorism. Yasser Arafat for instance, has advanced this argument:
The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the
reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and
fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the
settlers and the colonialists cannot possibly be called terrorist, otherwise
the American people in their struggle for liberation from the British
colonialists would have been terrorists; the European resistance against
the Nazis would be terrorism, the struggle of the Asian, African and
Latin American peoples would also be terrorism, and many of you who
are in this Assembly hall were considered terrorists. This is actually a
just and proper struggle consecrated by the United Nations Charter and
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As to those who fight
against the just causes, those who wage war to occupy, colonize and
oppress other people, those are the terrorists. Those are the people
whose actions should be condemned, who should be called war
criminals: for the justice of the cause determines the right to struggle.
Yasser Arafat, Chairman, Exec. Comm. Palestinian Liberation Org., Speech before
the General Assembly of the United Nations, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2282nd plen.
mtg. at 861, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2282 and Corr. 1 (Nov. 13, 1974). But see
HOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 20 (describing the Armenian nationalist movement’s
tactics against the ruling Turkish power in the 1880s and 1890s as a “terrorist
strategy” of “repeated attacks on its colonial administration and security forces, in
order to rally indigenous support, as well as to attract international attention,
sympathy and support”).
24 See HOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 35 (arguing that state-sponsored actions
may be distinguished from terrorism because such actions can be deemed
violations of international law or military rules of engagement and prosecuted
accordingly as war crimes). But see Syria Hits Out at ‘Terrorist’ US, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 28, 2008, 00:38 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7693583.stm
(noting that Syria’s foreign minister described a U.S. military helicopter bombing
of a Syrian town as a “terrorist” attack).
25 That some post-colonial nations have resisted the imposition of
international norms of the United States and European nations in the context of
counterterrorism law and policy is unsurprising given the perceptions of
differentiated (and lesser) legitimacy accorded to post-colonial nations in
discourses surrounding international rule-making. See Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial
Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of International Law: The
Unending War Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 10–15
(2010) (describing the history of the relationship between colonialism and modern
international law and its negative effects on “colonized and dominated polities”).
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killing of civilians, the lack of international consensus can be
viewed primarily as reflecting concern not over just the parameters
of the definition, but the legal effects of falling within that
definition.26
2.2. How 1373 Demands a Definition that Does Not Fully Exist
In the last twenty years, numerous international treaties and
United Nations resolutions have addressed the need for
counterterrorism measures without fully answering the
fundamental and ultimately frustrating question of how to define
terrorism.27
Perhaps the most striking of those measures is Security Council
Resolution 1373,28 adopted in the weeks after the September 11
attacks under great pressure from the United States government.29
26 See Antonio Cassese, Terrorism as an International Crime, in ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM, 213, 213–14 (Andrea Bianchi ed.,
2004) (describing the traditional notion that terrorism cannot carry a universal
definition and can only be characterized by certain discrete acts). Given the
concerns of moral relativism that pervade any debate about the definition of
terrorism, some believe that defining terrorism may neither be possible nor useful.
See, e.g., Cyrille Begorre-Bret, The Definition of Terrorism and the Challenge of
Relativism, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 1988–92 (2006) (analyzing arguments that
consider whether terrorism cannot, and should not be, defined).
27 See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, G.A. Res. 52/164, art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (Jan. 9, 1998)
(requesting that obligations be carried out with consideration for “principles of
sovereign equality and territorial integrity”); see also S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1368 (Sep. 12, 2001) (condemning the attacks of September 11, 2001, and
emphasizing a zero tolerance approach to international terrorism without
expressly defining terrorism); S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15,
1999) (reaffirming the obligation of all Member States to take counterterrorism
measures against those who organize or prepare terrorist acts but providing no
definition of terrorism); S.C. Res. 1189, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1189 (Aug. 13, 1998)
(condemning embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam and, without
defining terrorism, reaffirming Member States’ duty to take measures against
international terrorism).
28 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 1.
29 See Scheppele, supra note 10, at 455 (“It is no coincidence that UN Security
Council Resolution 1373, passed on 28 September 2001, mirrors almost exactly the
strategy for fighting terrorism that one sees in the USA PATRIOT Act, which the
US was drafting at the same time as it was urging the Security Council to act.”);
see also Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council:
Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 275, 284 (“A U.S. initiative,
the unanimous passage of Resolution 1373 was remarkably smooth.”). Johnstone
notes that some were skeptical of the measures passed by the Security Council in
the immediate aftermath of September 11, describing them as the imposition of
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Resolution 1373, in an arguably unprecedented step for the
Security Council,30 mandates that member states combat terrorism
in numerous ways, work cooperatively with other member states
to share information related to security issues, and report to the
Counter-Terrorism Committee—established for the purpose of
overseeing progress in fulfilling the mandate of Resolution 1373.31
Two serious shortcomings are immediately apparent in the
framework established by Resolution 1373, though. First, although
Resolution 1373 mandates that member states take serious action to
counter terrorism, it lacks a definition of terrorism that would
establish the parameters for the implementation of
counterterrorism efforts.
Second, although Resolution 1373
established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to oversee
implementation of Resolution 1373 requirements by member
states, there is no textual obligation in the resolution for the CTC to
safeguard human rights and the rule of law.32 The lack of initial
focus on rights protection was only later remedied after pressure
from interests concerned with human rights.33 Such pressure led to
“hegemonic international law.” See id. at 275 (citing Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic
International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 843 (2001)).
30 Scheppele, supra note 1, at 91–93 (detailing both the sweeping powers
given to the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the worrying gaps in human
rights it leaves unanswered).
31 See About the Counter-Terrorism Committee, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
COUNTER-TERRORISM COMM., http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/aboutus.html (last
updated May 10, 2011, 12:31 pm) (describing The Counter-Terrorism Committee’s
responsibility for monitoring the implementation of Resolution 1373).
32 See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 1, ¶ 6 (establishing The Counter-Terrorism
Committee and its power to implement Resolution 1373); see also E.J. Flynn, The
Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 371, 377 (2007) (noting that Resolution 1373 “made scant express reference to
human rights”). Flynn notes that the first Chair of the Counter-Terrorism
Committee, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, opined in 2002 that dealing with human rights
concerns was not within the purview of the Committee:
The Counter-Terrorism Committee is mandated to monitor the
implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). Monitoring performance
against other international conventions, including human rights law, is
outside the scope of the Counter-Terrorism Committee’s mandate. But
we will remain aware of the interaction with human rights concerns, and
we will keep ourselves briefed as appropriate. It is, of course, open to
other organizations to study States’ reports and take up their content in
other forums.
Id. at 377 (quoting Sir Jeremy Greenstock).
33 See Flynn, supra note 32, at 376–77 (noting that lobbying of the CTC by the
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passage of additional resolutions34 that served to remind both the
CTC and member states of their obligations under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights35 as well as other protocols.
Despite subsequent remedial efforts to counter the initial
inattention to human rights and rule of law concerns, the effect of
Resolution 1373 was immediate and profound.36 In the wake of the
passage of Resolution 1373, numerous countries with no working
or legal definition of terrorism sought to define terrorism as a
predicate to comply with the counterterrorism obligations of
Resolution 1373. Some nations simply indicated that they were
implementing Resolution 1373 with no definitional parameters.37

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and other groups led the Committee
to adopt “a line by which it would ‘remain aware’ of human rights concerns”); see
also U.N. S.C. Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 Concerning
Counter-Terrorism, Conclusions for Policy Guidance Regarding Human Rights
and the CTC, U.N. Doc. S/AC.40/2006/PG.2 (May 25, 2006) (setting forth the
CTC’s framework for addressing human rights concerns in conjunction with the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights).
34 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1624, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sep. 14, 2005) (stating
that the U.N. Security Council “[s]tresses that States must ensure that any
measures taken to implement [counterterrorism obligations] comply with all of
their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights
law, refugee law, and humanitarian law”); S.C. Res. 1456, ¶¶ 4(iii), 6, 8, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003) (emphasizing the importance of combating terrorism
using best practices and in conjunction with protection of human rights); see also
U.N. Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, supra note 16, ¶¶ 53–54.
(emphasizing Security Council resolutions requiring the CTC to account for
human rights in carrying out its objectives in years following Resolution 1373’s
passage).
35 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, part III, 19 December,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (listing the substantive and procedural rights guaranteed
under the Convention).
36 The governance of supranational bodies, such as the European Union, was
profoundly affected by the passage of Resolution 1373. E.g., EU AT UN, REPORT ON
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY, S407/08, at 2 (2008)
available
at
http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/documents/en
/081211_EU%20Security%20Strategy.pdf (“Everything the EU has done in the
field of security has been linked to UN objectives.”); see Case C-266/05 P, Sison v.
Council, 2007 E.C.R. I-1270, ¶¶ 78–79 (denying a citizen request for government
documents and finding support in Resolution 1373’s call for international
collaboration in fighting terrorism).
37 See, e.g., HOME DEP’T, THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM: A REPORT BY LORD
CARLILE OF BERRIEW Q.C. INDEPENDENT REVIEWER OF TERRORISM LEGISLATION, 2007,
Cm. 7052, ¶ 18, tbl. 1 (U.K.) [hereinafter CARLILE] (listing countries’ individual
definitions of terrorism, including those countries which have not provided their
own individual definitions).
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Other nations declined to define terrorism but indicated that they
were complying with international treaties and other obligations
that mandated counterterrorism efforts.38
Other countries, such as the United States, relied upon the
definitions of terrorism under domestic law to submit reports back
to the Counter-Terrorism Committee—these reports do not
actually offer a definition of terrorism, but detail the robust
counterterrorism efforts being made by the government. In late
2001, the twenty-five page U.S. report highlighted the legal
frameworks put in place to combat terrorism and terrorism
financing39 and underscored the seriousness of the punishments
for crimes of terrorism,40 but offered no discussion of human rights
concerns41 and little explication of the domestic definition of
terrorism on which these efforts were predicated.42
38 See, e.g., id. (identifying nations such as Albania and Estonia that rely upon
parameters of international treaties to serve as a proxy for a legal definition of
terrorism).
39 U.N. Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, Letter dated Dec. 19,
2001, from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant
to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1220 (Sep. 28, 2001) [hereinafter U.S.
2001 CTC submission].
40 U.S. 2001 CTC submission, supra note 39, at 17 (noting that “[t]errorist acts
are among the most serious offenses under U.S. law. Violent, terrorist-related
crimes generally carry substantially higher criminal penalties and can lead to
imposition of the death penalty, or life imprisonment.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§
2332(a), 2332(b)).
41 See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 1, ¶ 3(f) (calling upon member states to
“[t]ake appropriate measures in conformity with . . . national and international
law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee
status”); see also id. ¶ 3(g) (calling upon member states to “[e]nsure, in conformity
with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators,
organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts”).
42 Parts of the report include discussion of specific acts contained within the
definition of terrorism or “terrorist activity.” E.g., U.S. 2001 CTC submission,
supra note 39, at 7 (noting that under Executive Order 12947, the President
designated sixteen organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations based on the
commission, or risk of commission, of “acts of violence with the purpose or effect
of disrupting the Middle East peace process”); see also, e.g., id. at 15 (for the
purposes of immigration law, terrorist activity includes:

[H]ijacking; sabotage; detention under threat for the purpose of coercion
. . . ; violent attack on an internationally protected person; assassination;
the use of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons; or the use of
explosives, firearms, or any other weapon or dangerous device with the
intent to cause harm to individuals or damage to property).
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2.3. Resolution 1566: Working Around a Lack of Definition
Without an official definition of terrorism to work with, the
United Nations Security Council has established partial measures:
either by enacting resolutions that condemn acts of terrorism
without defining the parameters of terrorism,43 or by including
general descriptions of acts that fall within the rubric of terrorist
activity without purporting to fully define terrorism. Security
Council Resolution 1566, passed in 2004, clearly falls into the latter
category.44 It reaffirms its condemnation of the terrorist activity of
the Afghan Taliban,45 reminds Member States of their
counterterrorism obligations under previous Security Council
resolutions,46 notes the requirement to comply with international
humanitarian law in combating terrorism,47 and reminds Member
States of the supranational counterterrorism committees and
43 E.g., S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 27 (condemning the attacks of September 11,
2001, but not defining terrorism); see also S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1267
(Oct. 15, 1999) (condemning the actions of the Taliban and reaffirming the
obligation of all Member States to take counterterrorism measures without
defining what constitutes terrorist activity).
44 See Schmid, supra note 12, at 393 (noting that S.C. Res. 1566 came about
because of the lack of agreement on a definition of terrorism by the Ad Hoc
Committee on Terrorism within the General Assembly).
45 See S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (condemning
all forms of terrorism, regardless of its motivations).
46 See id. ¶ 2 (urging states to combat terrorism and adhere to international
law). Resolution 1566 does not speak to the question of whether national
governments can be considered to have committed terrorist acts, but adopts a
zero-tolerance stance that rules out an exception for freedom fighters or other
anti-colonial or anti-occupation violence, noting that terrorist violence is “under
no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical,
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature . . . .” Id. ¶ 3. This
same view is echoed in other Security Council resolutions that condemn terrorist
acts. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624, at 1 (Sept. 14, 2005)
(condemning terrorism “irrespective of [its] motivation, whenever and by
whomsoever committed”); S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (Oct. 19, 1999)
(emphasizing the need to intensify the fight against terrorism). The Council of
Europe also adopted this view in its 2005 Convention on the Prevention of
Terrorism. See Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism,
pmbl., May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. no. 196 (noting that “terrorist offences and the
offences set forth in this Convention, by whoever perpetrated, are under no
circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical,
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature”).
47 See S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 45, at 1 (urging states to adopt measures to
fight terrorism in accordance with international human rights, refugee, and
humanitarian law).
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structures that have been established pursuant to previous Security
Council Resolutions.48 Then Resolution 1566 goes further, offering
a partial explanation of a terrorist act as:
criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with
the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking
of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in
the general public or in a group of persons or particular
persons, intimidate a population or compel a government
or an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of
and as defined in the international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism . . . .49
Although seemingly expansive, Resolution 1566 limits the use
of the label of “terrorism” to offenses that are recognized in
previously agreed upon international conventions and protocols,
thereby tethering the implementation of Resolution 1566 to
offenses commonly understood to fall under the umbrella of
terrorism.50 Further, the language of the resolution limits its
application to acts that are intended to provoke terror and/or
compel a political response from a government.51 In framing the
parameters of terrorism in such a way, the Security Council
appears to have—at least for the purposes of Resolution 1566 and
the other United Nations’ measures that are referenced in
Resolution 1566—worked around the lack of consensus on this
issue in the General Assembly.
In terms of rights protection, in addition to the CounterTerrorism Committee taking into account the obligation of
Member States to adhere to human rights standards52 and the
48 See id. (calling on states to cooperate with the Counter-Terrorism
Committee established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), the
Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, and the Al-Qaida/Taliban
Sanctions Committee established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1267, in
the fight against terrorism).
49 Id. ¶ 3.
50 See id. (noting that the resolution applies to “offences within the scope of
and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism”).
51 See
id. (including the condemnation of threats to international
organizations).
52 The Counter-Terrorism Committee initially disclaimed any responsibility
for dealing with the human rights concerns that resulted from the implementation
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limiting language within Resolution 1566, the Security Council has
also designated an Ombudsperson to field petitions from
individuals and organizations seeking to be delisted from being
subject to international sanctions as terrorists.53 Concerned about
the severe repercussions of being designated as a terrorist, various
Member States moved for a process by which the designation
process could be made more fair and transparent, allow for a
delisting process for individuals and organizations, and strengthen
international security by improving the perceived legitimacy of the
United Nations as an international regulator of security matters.54
What do the partial definition and the ameliorating measures
mean in terms of the trajectory of post-September 11
counterterrorism initiatives being undertaken by the United
Nations? First, a number of Security Council resolutions make
clear that those defined as terrorists will be (or should be) dealt
with severely by Member States who are obligated by resolution or
protocol to adopt and implement robust counterterrorism
measures.
Second, although the Security Council has set some parameters
for terrorism, resolutions such as 1373 necessarily rely on domestic
legal definitions of terrorism to support counterterrorism efforts in
each Member State. Again, because of this reliance on domestic
law, which may ignore or circumvent consideration of human
rights issues, the Counter-Terrorism Committee has taken on the
role of mandating that member states adhere to their human rights
obligations in the implementation of Resolution 1373.
Finally, because of the harsh measures that result from terrorist
designation, the General Assembly has taken steps in recent years
of Resolution 1373. See, e.g., Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the
Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 333,
340 (2003) (addressing the challenge of combating terrorism while still protecting
human rights).
53 See S.C. Res. 1904, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009) (mandating
that “when considering delisting requests, the Committee shall be assisted by an
Office of the Ombudsperson”).
54 E.g., Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Amends United
Nations Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Regime, Authorizes Appointment of
Ombudsperson to Handle Delisting Issues, ¶ 14, U.N. Press Release SC/9825
(Dec.
17,
2009),
available
at
http://www.un.org/News/Press
/docs/2009/sc9825.doc.htm (noting the concern of delegations from various
nations that the process of designating terrorists be made more accessible,
transparent, and equitable).
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to ensure some transparency and due process to delist individuals
and organizations that are inappropriately designated as terrorists.
Each post-September 11th counterterrorism measure taken by
the United Nations has, at a later point, been moderated using
measures that lessen the potential for abuse. Nonetheless, because
Member States’ international obligations depend on domestic
definitions of terrorism, the potential for abuse that concerned the
United Nations continues to exist at the domestic level.
3.

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES: TRACKING THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM

The lack of certainty surrounding the definition of terrorism
and the Security Council mandate for counterterrorism measures
on both an international and domestic basis compels consideration
of how individual nations facing severe national security threats
define terrorism, where those definitions come from, and how they
are applied.
In each of the countries examined in this section, the lack of a
comprehensive definition on the global level has given rise to the
potential for abuse of human rights and deviation from the rule of
law as by-products of the effort to fight terrorism.55
3.1. United States
In the United States, federal law and agencies utilize dozens of
different definitions of terrorism,56 largely based on the agenda and

55 As noted previously, this concern has been discussed at some length by
various United Nations Special Rapporteurs. See U.N. Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights, supra note 16, ¶ 27 (“[R]epeated calls by the international
community for action to eliminate terrorism, in the absence of a universal and
comprehensive definition of the term, may give rise to adverse consequences for
human rights.”); Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protect.
of Human Rights, Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities, In Particular
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/40 (June 25,
2004) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing terrorists and terrorist activity from
legitimate actors and actions in instances of armed conflict generally).
56 See Perry, supra note 12, at 249–50 (examining twenty-two definitions of
terrorism under U.S. federal law). This plethora of federal definitions has led
government officials over the decades to note that the United States lacks an
official definition of terrorism, and that terrorism is “a phenomenon that is easier
to describe than define.” GEORGE H. W. BUSH, PUBLIC REPORT OF THE VICE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM 1 (1986).
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focus of the drafter of the definition.57 In this section, I consider
two definitions58—each used for different but related purposes by
the U.S. government—to evaluate the history and the application
of the definition. In the post-September 11 era, the political
pressure to combat terrorism and to accommodate the
undermining of civil liberties as a by-product of a robust
counterterrorism program has influenced the definitions of
terrorism as well as the scope of their application.59
57 See HOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 38 (discussing how the U.S. State
Department’s and U.S. Defense Department’s definitions of terrorism suit each
agency’s needs to fulfill its mission); Perry, supra note 12, at 270 (noting that “[i]t is
logical that different standards are used for making determinations relating to
vastly different public-policy objectives” in the immigration, surveillance and
insurance coverage contexts). Notably, the use of the label of “terrorism” in the
immigration and deportation context has been inappropriate, unjust, and overly
harsh in many situations. See generally CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL
JUSTICE & ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, UNDER THE RADAR: MUSLIMS
DEPORTED, DETAINED, AND DENIED ON UNSUBSTANTIATED TERRORISM ALLEGATIONS 2
(2011) (remarking that “religious, cultural, and political affiliation . . . of Muslims
are being construed as dangerous terrorism-related factors to justify detention,
deportation, and denial of immigration benefits”).
58 A
third definition that is relevant to international efforts of
counterterrorism is that contained in 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006). See 22 U.S.C. §
2656f(d)(2) (2006) (defining terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetuated against noncombatant targets”). This definition is used by
the State Department for reporting purposes in response to the requirements of
Resolution 1373 and other international obligations. The definition in 22 U.S.C. §
2656f(d)(2) is narrower in scope than the other definitions of terrorism that are
considered in this Article in several ways. First, the definition limits the label of
“terrorism” to violent acts which are premeditated and politically motivated, and
which are “perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents.” 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2). It also does not include military
targets and appears to exclude most state actors, even those that commit acts that
are considered to be criminal by the international community, such as the mass
killings in the Darfur region of Sudan. See generally Matthew H. Charity, The
Criminalized State: The International Criminal Court, the Responsibility to Protect, and
Darfur, Republic of Sudan, 37 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 67 (2011) (treating the situation in
Darfur as an example of a State failing its responsibility to protect its population, a
recognized expectation of the United Nations). Although the narrow construction
of the definition of terrorism in 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) is of interest, it is beyond
the scope of this Article’s analysis of how such definitions are used by the
government in the domestic context where potential criminal sanctions may
apply.
59 The label of “terrorism” has been applied by government officials in
numerous contexts that are far removed from the violent acts that are at the heart
of the legal definitions of terrorism. See, e.g., Letter from New York City Bar
Association, to Sen. Patrick Leahy et al. (July 22, 2009), available at
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/AETA_Animal&CivilRights_Letter072109.p
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3.1.1. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Relative to post-September 11 legislative definitions, the
definition of terrorism contained in the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)60 is limited in scope
and application, and contains important due process protections
for individuals and designated groups. Under the AEDPA,
terrorism is defined as:
An activity that involves a violent act or an act dangerous
to human life, property, or infrastructure, and appears to be
intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or to affect the conduct of government by mass
destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.61
This definition is more limited than that of the Patriot Act, but
its application is broader than that of the 1995 Executive Order
df (noting that the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act should be repealed in part
due to the misapplication of the label of “terrorism” to acts which destroy minkfarming equipment); Timothy Williams, New York’s Post-9/11 Terrorism Law is Used
to Convict a Bronx Gang Member in a Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007, at B1
(discussing the conviction of St. James Boys gang member Edgar Morales under
New York terrorism laws aimed at international terrorism organizations).
60 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217 (codified in scatter sections of 8, 18, and 28 U.S.C.)
(authorizing the Secretary to designate foreign organizations as terrorists if they
engage in terrorist activity as defined by the statute). The AEDPA was enacted in
response to the 1993 World Trade Center bombings and the 1995 bombing of the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City as part of a broader plan to
prevent material support to terrorists that was seen as essential to those
bombings. See JAMES BECKMAN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES TO HOMELAND
SECURITY AND ANTI-TERRORISM 25 (2007) (describing the effects of the World Trade
Center bombings, the Oklahoma City bombings, and the congressional
investigation into federal law enforcement actions in Waco on the passage of
AEDPA).
Congress also passed the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) in conjunction with the
AEDPA as part of a larger counterterrorism effort. Notably, however, the
Oklahoma City bombing was committed by a white U.S. citizen, prompting some
scholars to question whether the passage of the IIRIRA was a thinly veiled
racialization of terrorism. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 911
World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63 LA. L.
REV. 717, 725–26 (noting that George W. Bush accused the Clinton administration
of racial profiling in conjunction with counter-terrorism efforts in the 1990s).
61 See Exec. Order No. 13224, 31 C.F.R. 594 (explaining Congressional
findings and purpose).
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which preceded it and which applied specifically to the context of
the Middle East peace process being negotiated at the time.62 The
AEDPA, in contrast, is a wide-reaching statute, defining terrorism
for the purpose of designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations
(FTOs)—regardless of whether such organizations were related to
the peace process in the Middle East—and freezing the assets of
such organizations.63
Under the AEDPA, a specific process must be undertaken to
designate an organization as an FTO. It is a process that is open to
critique as being insufficiently rights-protective, but also
incorporates some important safeguards against abuse.64 Once the
FTO designation has been made by the State Department, limited

62 See Exec. Order No. 12,947, 3 C.F.R. 319 (1995) (finding that foreign
terrorist activities threaten peace of the Middle East and United States). Section 1
of this Executive Order empowers the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, to designate foreign persons
who intend to disrupt the Middle East peace process as individuals with whom all
financial transactions are to be blocked. See supra § 1 (prohibiting any
contribution of funds, goods, or services to such persons).
63 See, e.g., AEDPA §§ 219(a)(1)(A)-(C), 219(a)(2)(C) (codified in 8 USC
§1189(a)) (finding that anyone who interacts with FTOs is violating the statute,
and authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to freeze the assets of entities
designated as FTOs). President Clinton signed Executive Order 12,947 in January
1995, which was geared toward facilitating a peace agreement in the Middle East,
but gave broad authority to cabinet departments to designate Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs) with the purpose of disrupting their financial and
operational capabilities, thereby laying the foundation for the authority granted
under the AEDPA and Executive Order 13,224. See Exec. Order No. 12,947, supra
note 62 (establishing authority for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the
Treasury to limit property rights of designated terrorists). Executive Order 13,224,
signed by President George W. Bush in the weeks after the September 11 attacks,
reinforces the authority of the President and the Secretary of State, and authorizes
the Secretary of the Treasury to designate and isolate Foreign Terrorist
Organizations. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786 (2002) (finding it
necessary to utilize financial sanctions against foreign terrorists). The Executive
Order also adds various organizations to the list of FTOs. See Foreign Terrorist
Organizations,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/ct
/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last visited October 15, 2011) (listing forty-nine
organizations designated as FTOs by the State Department).
64 See AEDPA § 219(a) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)) (establishing both the
procedure used for designation as a terrorist organization as well as congressional
and judicial means available to pursue designations review and revocation); see
also Julie B. Shapiro, The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations: The Effect on Separation of Powers, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS
J. 547, 556–58 (2008) (arguing that the designation process contravenes due
process guarantees).
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procedural safeguards are available, after which the designation is
finalized.65
Because the consequences of FTO designation can be severe66—
for example, financial intuitions may block or freeze assets of an
FTO,67 individuals may be barred from entry into the United
States,68 and material support to such an organization is a criminal
offense carrying potentially lengthy prison sentences69—the
procedural safeguards, however limited, are crucial.
One such safeguard in the FTO designation process is the
opportunity to contest the designation proposed by the State
Department.
This layer of judicial review protects against
arbitrariness in the designation,70 and requires some disclosure of
the basis upon which the State Department made its
determination.71
65 Under AEDPA, the Secretary of State notifies leaders in Congress and
gives notice to designees in the Federal Register. AEDPA § 302(a)(2)(A) (codifed
as 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(A)). FTOs then have 30 days to challenge their
designation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Court. §
302(b). Such cases, usually based on allegations of an abuse of discretion by the
State Department or a lack of substantial support for the FTO designation, are
largely unsuccessful. E.g., People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327
F.3d 1238, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding FTO designation based on classified
evidence and emphasizing deference to the State Department in the FTO
designation process); See also United States v. Afshari, 446 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006)
(Kozinski, A., dissenting) (arguing against the majority’s denial of a petition of a
defendant who convicted of contributing funds to an FTO, and noting that
individual defendants are statutorily barred from contesting the designation of an
FTO).
66 See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 196
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing the severe impact of FTO designation).
67 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2) (2006).
68 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V) (2006).
69 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006). The constitutionality of the FTO designation
process authorized by Executive Order No. 13,224 and various statutes was
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
70 Under the AEDPA, courts have the power to set aside the State
Department designation of an FTO if it is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of
discretion, or if it is not based on substantial evidence. AEDPA § 302(b)(3)
(codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(3)). Courts have, however, been extremely
deferential to the State Department, choosing not to review classified evidence in
some instances, but relying instead on State Department affirmations of
substantial evidence to support its designation decision. E.g., People’s Mojahedin
Org. of Iran, 327 F.3d at 1244.
71 E.g., People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. United States Dep’t of State, 613
F.3d 220, 231 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the government had violated due
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A second important safeguard is the mandatory review and
renewal process for the Secretary of State.72 If no State Department
review has been made of an FTO designation for five years, the
Secretary of State must review the listing to determine whether it
should be revoked due to a change in the organization’s mission
and actions, or a change in the national security assessment by the
United States.73 These safeguards echo the review and delisting
process that the United Nations adopted in order to ensure that
terrorists are being appropriately identified and that the
ramifications of being designated a terrorist, however severe, are
applied appropriately and with due consideration.74
3.1.2. Patriot Act
The USA PATRIOT Act,75 passed in the weeks immediately
following the September 11 attacks, offered a panoply of
counterterrorism resources to the government, including an
increase in surveillance powers76 and government authority to
conduct intelligence-gathering operations in matters of suspected
terrorism,77 as well as allowing for the civil seizure of assets based
process by failing to give an FTO the opportunity to view unclassified evidence
prior to making a final decision denying petition to revoke designation as an
FTO).
72 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(C), (a)(6) (2006).
73 Id.
74 In some respects, the FTO designation process and the opportunity for
organizations to be delisted are an early example of the current, more rightsprotective procedural safeguards now being mandated by the United Nations. In
the landmark European Court of Justice decision of Kadi, the court found that the
fundamental right to due process related to the determination that an individual
or organization was subject to sanctions under U.N. Security Council Resolution
1267 could not be contravened. See Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi
& Al Barakaat v. Council, 2008 E.C.R. I-6411 (2008). This decision made clear that
the determination that sanctions must be accompanied—like the U.S. FTO
designation process—by a meaningful opportunity to contest the designation. See
id. ¶ 318 (noting that due process is a fundamental right under European
Community standards and it cannot be stripped by a regulation or court).
75 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.) [hereinafter Patriot
Act].
76 See id. § 218 (amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
such that electronic surveillance and physical searches need only be justified in
“significant” part by the goal of obtaining foreign intelligence).
77 Id. § 901.
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only on probable cause,78 and heightened punishments for any of
the underlying crimes related to the newly broadened
understanding of “domestic terrorism,” which includes:
[A]cts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State [that]
appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.79
Notably, this definition of domestic terrorism was not created
ad hoc in the weeks after the September 11 attacks. Instead, under
intense pressure to amend various existing criminal statutes to
broaden and strengthen the government’s resources before another
attack potentially took place, Congress moved quickly80 to revamp
the existing counterterrorism framework.81
The definition of terrorism used in the Patriot Act was
imported from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
Id. § 806.
Id. § 802. Critics of this broad definition have noted that such language
could encompass numerous activist groups, including Greenpeace, protestors of
the World Trade Organization, Operation Rescue, and protesters of bomb-testing
facilities on the island of Vieques. See How the USA PATRIOT Act redefines
“Domestic Terrorism,” AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 6, 2002),
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/how-usa-patriot-act-redefines-domesticterrorism (analyzing the effect of the Patriot Act definition of terrorism if the
government applied the act to Vieques protesters).
80 See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS
AND LIBERTY 11 (2008) (arguing that the legislative role in safeguarding civil
liberties is hampered by the political reality that legislators must be seen as
reacting quickly to a terrorist attack).
81 See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Six Weeks in Autumn, WASHINGTON POST
MAGAZINE, Oct. 27, 2002, at 6, 10 (describing the pressured deliberations of
Congress and the executive branch in drafting the Patriot Act); See also 147 CONG.
REC. 20,700–02 (2001) (statement of Senator Russell Feingold) (noting that
Congress had been under “relentless” pressure from the administration to pass
the Patriot Act legislation “without deliberation or debate”). Unlike deliberations
on most bills, the Senate did not conduct committee hearings by the Senate and
the House of Representatives held only one hearing at which the sole witness was
Attorney General John Ashcroft. See DONOHUE, supra note 80, at 1–2 (describing
rushed legislative effort to pass Patriot Act in the aftermath of the attacks on
September 11, 2001).
78
79
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(FISA).82 The FISA definition of terrorism requires, among other
elements, that the perpetrators intend the intimidation of a civilian
population or political coercion,83 which naturally limits the
application of the provision to certain types of acts. Likewise, the
government purpose at issue in FISA is limited. The text of the
statute84 and its legislative history make clear that FISA is meant to
be a limited and relatively narrow statute focused only on the
intelligence-gathering operations of the government, not for
criminal investigations and prosecutions.85
See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2006).
The definition of international terrorism in FISA includes several elements:
that it “involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State;”
that it “appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the
conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping” and occur totally
outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries. Id.
84 Title I of FISA, “Electronic Surveillance within the United States for
Foreign Intelligence Purposes,” makes clear the scope of the statute’s application.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified as amended in 50 U.S.C.). Provisions within the statute limit the use of
any intelligence gathered pursuant to the authorized surveillance. See 50 U.S.C. §
1806(b) (“No information acquired pursuant to this title shall be disclosed for law
enforcement purposes unless such disclosure is accompanied by a statement that
such information . . . may only be used in a criminal proceeding with the advance
authorization of the Attorney General.”).
85 FISA’s legislative history contains numerous statements that make clear
members of Congress considering the bill were concerned about individual
privacy rights and limited the focus of the statute to intelligence-gathering. For
example, part of the legislative history states:
82
83

It is important to note that the committee’s favorable recommendation of
[FISA] in no way reflects any judgment that it would also be appropriate
to depart from the standard of criminal activity as the basis for using
other intrusive investigative techniques. The bill does not impliedly
authorize departure from the standard of criminality in other aspects of
national security investigations or intelligence collection directed at
Americans without the safeguards of judicial review and probable cause.
S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 18 (1977). Likewise, senators expressed a clear intent
that the definition of terrorism is intended to be limited to acts or support of
“serious violence—for example, purchase or surreptitious importation into the
United States of explosives, planning for assassinations, or financing of or training
for such activities.” S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 26 (1978). The range of actions
considered to be “terrorism” under FISA is broader than a single criminal act, but
not as broad as current understandings, as recently demonstrated by the Supreme
Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, which upheld criminalization of
material support to humanitarian and non-violent activities of a designated
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Given the far-reaching consequences of being suspected of
terrorism and the broad powers for surveillance authorized under
FISA at the time of its enactment, Congress expressed significant
concern over the implications of FISA on civil liberties, and the
This concern led to
potential for government overreach.86
numerous safeguards beyond the limited scope of application of
the legislation, including the reporting requirements of the
Attorney General to Congress regarding the nature and extent of
FISA-based surveillance conducted,87 the mandated minimization
procedures to ensure that individual privacy rights are
safeguarded to some extent,88 and the penalties available to punish
those who conduct unlawful and overreaching surveillance.89
Despite the concern expressed in FISA’s legislative history
about the spillover of FISA into the criminal investigation and
prosecution arena, key provisions including the definition of
terrorism itself were repurposed for insertion into criminal statutes
with no substantial debate by Congress. For example, 18 U.S.C. §
2331, enacted in 199290 as the predicate for contemporaneously
Foreign Terrorist Organization. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.
Ct. 2705 (2010); see also Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity:
Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV.
173, 200–07 (2003) (detailing the difficulty in separating terrorist activities from
non-terrorist activities of FTOs).
86 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 26 (1978) (noting that “[c]oncern . . . has been
expressed that [parts of FISA] could permit surveillance solely on the basis of
information that someone might commit acts of terrorism or sabotage in the
distant future. This is clearly not the intent of the committee”). In his remarks,
Senator Malcolm Wallop noted that the purpose of FISA was for Congress to try
to strike a balance between civil liberties and the intelligence community’s need
for heightened surveillance. Id. at 91–96 (Remarks of Sen. Wallop).
87 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1807, 1808 (2006) (describing the reports required by the
Attorney General and other congressional oversight measures).
88 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2006) (directing the use of minimization
procedures to “minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the
dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting
United States persons”); 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(C) (2006) (describing the way in
which minimization requirements should be met); see also S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 23
(1977) (noting the importance of protecting liberty interests by not conducting
surveillance on an entire group if probable cause only extends to certain
individuals within the group).
89 E.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1809, 1810 (2006) (describing civil liability and criminal
sanctions for breaches of FISA).
90 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2006) (adopting a definition of terrorism similar to the
one found in FISA).
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passed criminal measures seeking to combat terrorism, adopts the
FISA language defining terrorism.91
The Patriot Act amended the definition of terrorism from 18
U.S.C. § 2331 slightly, only to broaden its scope and application
further.92 However, the 2001 Patriot Act amendments included an
important sunset provision—added in part because of the haste
with which the legislation was passed—that forced Congress to
reexamine the wisdom of the legislation at intervals of several
years.93 Although Congress debated the renewal of certain parts of
the Patriot Act in 2005—none of which involved the definition of
terrorism—in March 2006, Congress renewed most provisions,
removed the safeguard of a sunset provision, and made the
provisions permanent.94
The Patriot Act definition of terrorism now has an
extraordinarily far reach, especially in light of the limited original
application of the FISA definition to the non-criminal purpose of
intelligence-gathering. This repurposing and re-contextualization
of the FISA definition of terrorism has gone unexamined by

91 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-242, at 179–80 (1991) (noting that the definition of
terrorism stems from FISA and noting the need to significantly expand U.S.
counterterrorism efforts in light of numerous acts of international terrorism
during the 1980s, including the hijacking of the Achille Lauro).
92 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (including “mass destruction” as a means by which
terrorists operate).
93 See id. § 2510 (commenting that Section 801 of Pub. L 90-351 provided a
sunset provision for various counterterrorism tools, including those related to
wiretapping and surveillance); see also 147 CONG. REC. 20,695–96 (2001) (statement
of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (noting the importance of the sunset provision in terms of
both discouraging an abuse of power by the administration and increasing the
incentive for Congressional oversight). But see DONOHUE, supra note 80, at 14–15
(arguing that provisions subject to sunset provisions are almost always renewed,
making their efficacy as a procedural protection questionable).
94 See JAMES BECKMAN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES TO HOMELAND
SECURITY AND ANTI-TERRORISM 31 (2007) (describing how sunset provisions were
adopted, extended, and then removed). Only three provisions not dealing with
the definition of terrorism were still kept subject to the sunset provisions. Id.
Those provisions were extended in May 2011 until 2015. See Paul Kane & Felicia
Somnez, Patriot Act Amendments Signed into Law Despite Bipartisan Resistance from
Congress, WASHPOST.COM, May 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/patriot-act-extension-signed-into-law-despite-bipartisan-resistance-incongress/2011/05/27/AGbVlsCH_story.html (describing the extension of
surveillance provisions of the Patriot Act).
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Congress, yet has a profound impact as the definition triggers
numerous effects for those caught within its scope.95
The lack of parallel due process protections in the application
of the Patriot Act exacerbates the problems inherent in applying
conflicting definitions of terrorism, including the potential lack of
notice to individuals as to whether they will be categorized as a
terrorist and exactly what kind of conduct is prohibited.96
95 Although in a different context, this repurposing and re-contextualization
of a definition is reminiscent of the post-September 11th decision by John Yoo and
others within the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice to cobble
together a definition of “torture” for the purpose of setting the parameters of
detainee treatment from non-legal dictionaries, health care statutes, and other
sources. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President 5–6 (Aug. 1, 2002) (defining torture to mean severe discomfort or pain).
Such distorted legal reasoning later came under much criticism, both from within
the George W. Bush administration and the scholarly community. But see
Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L
SEC. LAW & POL’Y 455, 464–66 (2005) (describing the shortcomings of the OLC
memorandum, stating that “[w]hen a lawyer gives legal advice . . . she has a
professional obligation of candor toward her client . . . . [T]he lawyer’s role is not
simply to spin out creative legal arguments. It is to offer her assessment of the
law as objectively as possible” (citing Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2.1
(2003))); Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 9,
2007, at 42 (noting that when he started at the OLC in 2003, Jack Goldsmith
reviewed the Bybee and Yoo Memoranda and found them to be “tendentious,
overly broad and legally flawed”).
To some extent, the Office of Legal Counsel memoranda reflect a Youngstown
dilemma in that they are a product of insular, unilateralist thinking, whereas the
definitions underpinning counterterrorism legislation are congressionally
sanctioned. However, the practical effect of Congress’s imprimatur is that the
definitions are extreme; the definitional repurposing in legislation is less extreme,
public, and largely ignored, yet still problematic.
96 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 12, at 270 (arguing that conflicting definitions of
terrorism could result in confusion and ambiguity); see also SUBCOMM. ON
TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SEC. & HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON
INTELLIGENCE, 107TH CONG., COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE
PRIOR TO 9-11: A REPORT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE
MINORITY LEADER (2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress
/2002_rpt/hpsci_ths0702.html (reviewing alternative ways to combat terrorism in
order to prevent future attacks). The Subcommittee’s recommendation that a
single definition of terrorism be agreed upon by all U.S. agencies was predicated
on a concern that a lack of uniform definition would lead to terrorist acts being
treated identically under the law as ordinary criminal acts. Id.
The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130
S. Ct. 2705 (2010), adds further uncertainty to the question of what individuals
and organizations will be prosecuted under the material support statute, and on
what basis. See Wadie E. Said, The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy,
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Further, critics of the Patriot Act and the FTO designation
process note that the post-September 11th racialized application of
the label of terrorism to those perceived to be Muslim or Arab,97
which only serves to foment distrust among domestic and
international Muslim and Arab communities.98 Other critics accuse
the government of subjectivity in the application of terrorism label
on various actors, claiming that the designation process depends
more on the political sympathies of politicians and targeted groups
and individuals than objectively applied criteria.99
86 IND. L.J. 543, 577–78 (2011) (describing the role of specific intent in statutes
relating to material support of terrorists); see also Peter Margulies, Advising
Terrorism: Hybrid Scrutiny, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech 33 (Roger Williams
Univ. Legal Studies Research Series, Working Paper No. 101, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1777371 (arguing that the
majority opinion failed to specify how much coordination with a foreign terrorist
organization would lead to a violation of the federal statute prohibiting material
support to these organizations); cf. Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario:
Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 12–18
(2005) (discussing the enactment of the material support statute).
97 See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1575–76
(2002) (discussing the racialization of Arab and Muslim Americans after the
September 11th attacks); Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 911 World:
Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717,
725–32 (2003) (arguing that U.S. counterterrorism law and policy has intentionally
singled out those perceived as Muslim or Arab to bear the brunt of the curtailing
of civil liberties and human rights); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House
Extends a Hand to Muslims Wary of Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, at A1
(reporting on how hearings to be held by the House Committee on Homeland
Security are controversial based on the perception that the government is
equating domestic terrorism with Islam).
98 See Tom Tyler, et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism
Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365, 368, 369–70 (2010)
(finding a “robust correlation between perceptions of procedural justice and both
perceived legitimacy and willingness to cooperate among Muslim American
communities in the context of anti-terrorism policing,” and noting that, under a
normative model of anti-terrorism measures, “people obey the law and cooperate
with legal authorities when they view government as legitimate and thus entitled
to be obeyed”); see also GABRIELLA BLUM & PHILIP B. HEYMANN, LAWS, OUTLAWS, &
TERRORISTS: LESSONS FROM THE WAR ON TERRORISM 162–63, 168–69, 174–75 (2010)
(discussing people’s perceptions in predominantly Muslim countries that U.S.
foreign policy is hegemonic and anti-Islamic).
99 See, e.g., James T. Kelly, The Empire Strikes Back: The Taking of Joe Doherty, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 317, 398–99 (1992) (arguing that the U.S. government acted
inconsistently with regard to the imprisonment of Irish Republican Army
“terrorist” Joe Doherty and the White House reception for South African
“freedom-fighter” Nelson Mandela); see also Perry, supra note 12, at 270 (stating
that “different standards are used for making determinations relating to vastly
different public policy objectives”).
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Given the subjective application of the label of terrorism100 and
its far-reaching implications, some scholars have suggested that the
most just resolution may be for governments to forego separate
definitions of terrorism and rely instead on the criminalization of
the underlying substantive acts.101 Such an overhaul of domestic
legislation is unrealistic given the current political climate that
militates toward the increase in legal measures taken specifically in
the name of counterterrorism. However, the experiences of other
nations in defining terrorism and identifying potential abuses in
the application of such definitions can offer insight into and
guidance for potential improvements in the use of such definitions
in the domestic context.
3.2. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom, although dealing with numerous
internal and external threats to national security and emergency
situations over many decades,102 did not attempt to define
The subjectivity in applying the definition of terrorism is clear in the 2007
conviction and sentencing of gang member, Edgar Morales, under the New York
state anti-terrorism statute—a conviction that was overturned in 2011 based on
the appellate court’s finding of a lack of nexus between Morales’ reckless killing of
a girl during a gang-related altercation and the legislature’s intended definition of
terrorism. See People v. Morales, 924 N.Y.S.2d 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (vacating
the terrorism charges of Morales’ prior conviction and sentencing, decreasing
Morales’ murder sentence, and opining that New York’s definition of terrorism
mirrors that of FISA); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25(1) (McKinney 2001)
(defining terrorism, in part, as committing a specific offense with “the intent to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population”).
100 See Perry, supra note 12, at 271–72 (noting that the lack of precision of the
definition of terrorism stems from political considerations, which should be kept
separate from the legal categorizations).
101 See id. (raising the question of necessity of a definition of terrorism and
ultimately concluding that a lack of legal definition is unworkable and
undesirable). Critics of government approaches to defining terrorism note that,
historically, the United States has designated the types of violent acts, delineated
in the Patriot Act and the AEDPA, as criminal acts for the purpose of
delegitimizing the actors and not giving them the cache that may be associated
with being called a “terrorist” or “combatant.” See HOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 15
(describing the different and evolving meaning of “terrorism”); see also Mary Ellen
O’Connell, The Legal Case Against the Global War on Terror, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 349, 355–56 (2004) (describing dangers associated with an overly broad
definition of “terrorist”).
102 See HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE
BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON 7TH JULY 2005, 2005–06 (2005) H.C. 1087, at 2 (U.K.),
available
at
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10
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terrorism comprehensively until relatively recently. The definition
is of serious practical importance as the label triggers
governmental powers such as the right to arrest terrorism suspects
without a warrant,103 the ability to hold an arrestee in pre-charge
detention for up to 28 days when he is suspected of a terrorismrelated activity,104 the issuance of a control order,105 the prohibition
against publishing statements that encourage terrorism,106 and the
proscription of terrorist organizations.107
The Prevention of Terrorism Acts of both 1974108 and 1989109
attempted to define terrorism for the limited purpose of fighting
against Catholic nationalist forces in Northern Ireland associated
with the Troubles.110 In this context, terrorism was defined broadly
as “the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of
violence for the purpose of putting the public . . . in fear.”111
Arguably, such a broad definition can encompass almost any act of
/1087/1087.pdf (detailing the multiple bombings that killed dozens of people in
Britain); see, e.g., CONFLICT ARCHIVE ON THE INTERNET, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk (last
visited Oct. 15, 2011) (describing the history of the Troubles in Northern Ireland);
103 See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 41 (U.K.) (outlining that a constable has
the power to arrest a person he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist without a
warrant).
104 See, e.g., Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 23(7) (U.K.) (outlining the period in
which warrants can be extended).
105 See, e.g., Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 1(1) (U.K.) (defining a
control order as “an order against an individual that imposes obligations on him
for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of
terrorism”).
106 See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.) (delineating what constitutes an
encouragement of terrorism and outlining punishments for the offense).
107 See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 3 (U.K.) (allowing the Secretary of State to
add an organization to the proscribed list if it has any activities concerning
terrorism); see also Alexander Horne, The Terrorism Act 2000: Proscribed
Organizations, SN/HA/00815 House of Commons Library, Home Affairs Section
(Aug. 9, 2011), available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN00815.pdf
(describing the recent history and present status of “proscribed organizations”
under the anti-terrorism legislation).
108 See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c. 56, § 13,
sch. 1 (U.K.) (defining the Irish Republican Army as a proscribed organization).
109 See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 4, § 24
(U.K.) (making further provisions to hinder the establishment of more explosives
factories in Northern Ireland).
110 See CONFLICT ARCHIVE ON THE INTERNET, supra note 102 (outlining past and
current conflicts and politics affecting Northern Ireland).
111 See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c. 56, § 9(1)
(defining terrorism and other provisions in the Act).
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violence that occurs in public, but little opposition was raised
regarding such a definition, perhaps given the limited scope of its
application—to a specific region and a specific context—and the
fact that many British citizens viewed the Catholic separatists in
Northern Ireland as an outsider group.112 To these citizens, the
separatists did not deserve the more robust legal protections that
would accompany a narrower definition of terrorist activity.
3.2.1. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2000
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2000 marks a turning point in
British counterterrorism law and policy, as it reflects an effort to
create a uniform counterterrorism law to apply to all parts of the
United Kingdom, and not specifically created to deal with
Northern Ireland113 or other specific conflict situations.114
The definition of terrorism that Parliament adopted in the
statute was debated at length,115 and ultimately included several
key elements, including an ideological basis for the terrorist action
or threat of action, a high level of seriousness of the action, and an
element of violence broadly defined to include physical violence,
risks to public safety and disruption of electronic systems.116
112 See Setty, supra note 3, at 172 (describing the use of specialized trials for
only particular terrorist groups).
113 For a general discussion of the history of the Troubles, see Conflict and
Politics
in
Northern
Ireland,
CAIN
WEB
SERVICE,
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (chronicling the
background, key issues and key events of the conflict).
114 Parliament passed this legislation, in part, to comply with European
Union requirements that anti-terrorism legislation be codified in one statute and
that human rights concerns be addressed within comprehensive anti-terrorism
legislation. See The European Convention on Human Rights, 1 E.T.S. 5 (1968); see
also BECKMAN, supra note 94, at 55 (describing the UK’s terrorism policy prior to
the 2000 codification as a “hodgepodge of different laws, and different police and
intelligence organizations”).
115 See United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights, supra note 55 (noting through example the
length of time devoted to the definition included in the Terrorism Act of 2000).
116 Terrorism is defined as (1) the use or threat of action where the use or
threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental
organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or
threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological
cause, and (2) it involves serious violence against a person, involves serious
damage to property, endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person
committing the action, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or
a section of the public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to
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At first glance, such restrictive language appears to narrow the
definition of terrorism from that of the 1989 legislation. However,
additional catch-all language at the end of the definition, including
the characterization of terrorism as any use or threat of serious
violence against a person, serious damage to property, serious risk
to the health and safety of the public, or disruption of an electronic
system, so long as a firearm or explosive is involved and regardless
of motivation of the actor,117 broadens the scope of the legislation
enormously by removing the requirement of a politically
motivated intent. The text of the definition suggests that any
violent act committed against another person where a firearm is
involved may be considered terrorism by the government and
treated as such.
Given its open-ended construction, the definition of terrorism
has come under considerable criticism from academics and the
British parliamentarians for its potential for abuse of individuals
affiliated with politically unpopular causes who oppose the
government.118 Compounding the effect of the broad definition of
disrupt an electronic system. Terrorism Act, 2000, c.11, §1(1)–(2) (U.K.).
Finally, under subsection (3), any use or threat of action falling within
subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism
qualifies as terrorism, regardless of the purpose of the action is to influence the
government or intimidate the public. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, §1(2)–(3) (U.K.).
117 See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, Part I (U.K.) (describing situation where
subsection two of the act need not be satisfied).
118 See JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: TERRORISM BILL AND RELATED MATTERS, THIRD REPORT, 2005–06,
H.L. 75–I, H.C. 561–I, para. 12 (U.K.). The report states that:
The main problem to which [the definition of terrorism in the Terrorism
Act 2000] gives rise, is that the counter-terrorism measures are capable of
application to speech or actions concerning resistance to an oppressive
regime overseas . . . . The Home Secretary does not deny that this is the
effect of the offence but defends its scope on the basis that there is
nowhere in the world today where violence can be justified as a means of
bringing about political change.
Id. See also ANDREW BLICK, TUFYAL CHOUDHURY AND STUART WEIR, THE RULES OF
GAME: TERRORISM, COMMUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 44 (2005) (arguing that the
2000 Act’s broad definition leaves room for the persecution of legitimate political
activities). The authors note further that the vagueness and breadth of the
Terrorism Act 2000 definition of terrorism could be incompatible with Article 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees freedom of
expression. See also The European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 114,
art. 10(1) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions . . . without interference by public authority and
THE
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terrorism is the fact that the Act expands the list of substantive
crimes related to terrorism to include material support119 and
incitement,120 and shifts the burden onto defendants to disprove
their affiliation with terrorist organizations.121
Further, the
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2000 also allows for the stop and
search of any individuals whom police “reasonably suspect” of
being involved in terrorism.122 This provision has led to the
disproportionate targeting of South Asian men by police, often
leading to periods of pre-arrest detention, and then release when
the police decided not to charge the suspects with a crime.123 In
fact, the police have stated that the value of the stop and search
power was not to gather intelligence or to capture individuals who
have plotted or executed attacks, but as a tool to disrupt and deter
potential terrorist activity, further noting that the stop and search
powers were sometimes applied “in a pretty random way.”124
Since subsequent antiterrorism legislation continued the trend,
established by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2000, of increasing
police powers and curtailing civil liberties, the effects of the broad
definition of terrorism in the 2000 Act and the potential abuse of
human rights continue to be significant.
These effects were exacerbated by the perception after
September 11, 2001 that a fundamental change had occurred in the

regardless of frontiers.”).
119 See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, §§ 15–16, 18 (U.K.).
120 Id. §§ 59–61.
121 Id. § 41(1). This burden-shifting provision was diluted to some extent by
the House of Lords in Sheldrake v. DPP, [2003] EWCA Crim 762, [2004] UKHL 43,
[2005] 1 A.C. (H.L.) [264] (appeal taken from Eng.).
122 Terrorism Act, 2000, c.11, §43 (U.K.).
123 See U.K. HOME OFFICE, STATISTICS ON RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
21–34
(2006),
available
at
http://www.statewatch.org
/news/2006/mar/s95race05.pdf (describing disparities in stop and search rates
between groups); see also BLICK, supra note 118, at 49–50 (noting the percentage of
British Muslims surveyed who describe being stopped and searched).
124 See HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, TERRORISM AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS,
SIXTH REPORT, 2004–05, H.C. 165–I para. 54 (U.K.) (referring to the Memorandum
submitted by the Association of Chief Police Officers). Of the 702 arrests made
under the Terrorism Act 2000 that occurred in the three years immediately
following September 11, 2001, fifty percent (351 of 702 arrests) resulted in the
release of the arrestee without charge. Id. para. 55. Notably, of the convictions
under the Act, similar percentages of convicts were affiliated with Islamist causes
as the Irish Republican Army. Id. para 56.
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nature of threats to national security.125 Although there is much
disagreement as to whether the new policies and laws are effective
in combating short-term and long-term national security threats,126
the British government, police forces, and critics of the legislation
agree that the effects of the new security measures fall
disproportionately on the British Muslim population.127 In fact, the
public support for the more stringent legislation appears to be
predicated, in part, by the understanding that the effects of the
legislation will be felt most by a small minority of the British
population128—a reaction that appears to mirror the indifference to
curtailed liberties for the Catholic population of Northern Ireland
during the Troubles.
This racialized application of antiterrorism laws has led to a
counterproductive result: resentment among the British Muslim
population and sympathy among Muslim communities for
extremist groups.129 The same phenomenon occurred during the
Troubles in Northern Ireland, in which legislation that appeared to
be facially neutral was applied disproportionately to the Catholic
population there. In the context of that conflict, disparate
treatment led to a backlash against the British government and
encouraged moderate Catholics to sympathize with and protect
even violent separatists.130
125 See BLICK, supra note 118, at 9 (describing how terrorism and counterterrorism measures affect the relationship of trust between the public and
government).
126 See, e.g., BECKMAN, supra note 94, at 65–66 (analyzing arguments regarding
the efficacy of the robust counterterrorism measures authorized under the 2000
Terrorism Act).
127 See BLICK, supra note 118, at 9 (describing potential effects terrorism and
counter-terrorism measures on the Muslim community); Setty, supra note 3, at
149–50 (noting the counterterrorism techniques used in Northern Ireland during
the Troubles of the 1970s and 1980s).
128 See BLICK supra note 118, at 12 (noting that members of the general public
did not feel that the 2000 Terrorism Act, or other antiterrorism legislation, would
impinge on their rights because it was their understanding that the most intrusive
aspects of the legislation “will not be used against ‘us,’ they will be used against
‘them’”).
129 See id. at 15 (describing the growing sympathy for “religious and political
extremism” among Britain’s Muslim communities).
130 See id. at 33–34 (noting that that the government never realized the
“potentially damaging effects” of counter-terrorism measures); see also Setty, supra
note 3, at 156–57 (describing how military sources saw a subsequent increase in
political violence following the internment program in Northern Ireland).
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3.2.2. Subsequent Anti-Terrorism Legislation
In the years following the September 11 attacks, Parliament
passed a number of statutes meant to increase the number of
substantive offenses associated with terrorism, the counterterrorism powers of the government, and the penalties associated
with a terrorism conviction. All of these measures were still
predicated on the expansive and unevenly applied definition of
terrorism that was laid out in the 2000 Act.
The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATSCA)131
was passed in an unusually fast timeframe in the months after the
September 11 attacks132 and eliminated several of the procedural
and civil liberty safeguards that Parliament took care to include in
the 2000 Act. For example, whereas the 2000 Act—given the
expansive reach of its definition of terrorism—took care to disallow
criminal prosecution as terrorists of bystanders who choose not to
speak during an investigation, that provision was reinstated in
ATSCA.133 ATSCA also authorized the indefinite detention and
removal of aliens who, without a trial or process, were merely
suspected of being terrorists.134 Although this provision was
judicially rejected in 2004, it demonstrates the severe ramifications
of being labeled—without trial or further process—a terrorist.135
131 See generally Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001, c.24 (U.K.)
(hereinafter ATSCA) (amending the 2000 Terrorism Act through the addition of
further provisions against terrorism including the freezing of assets and the
extension of criminal laws and powers for law enforcement).
132 In November 2011, the House of Commons Select Committee on Home
Affairs reported its discomfort at the speedy passage of such consequential
legislation. See HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ANTI-TERRORISM CRIME AND SECURITY
ACT OF 2001, FIRST REPORT, 2001, at paras. 11, 68. “A Bill . . . with major
implications for civil liberties should not be passed by the House in such a short
period and with so little time for detailed examination in committee.” Id. at para.
68.
133 See ATSCA, supra note 131, § 117 (stating that a “person commits an
offence if he does not disclose the information as soon as reasonably practicable”).
See also BECKMAN, supra note 94, at 69 (discussing the reinstatement of the
bystander cooperation rule).
134 See ATSCA, supra note 131, at § 23 (“A suspected international terrorist
may be detained . . . despite the fact that his removal or departure from the United
Kingdom is prevented”). Reports suggest that fourteen individuals had been
subject to indefinite detention, some for longer than two years, under this
provision. BECKMAN, supra note 94, at 72.
135 The detention and removal provisions of ATSCA were rejected in A v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, in which the Law Lords held that the
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The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005,136 although subject to
robust and heated debate,137 continued Parliament’s trend toward
increasing police power, expanding substantive offenses related to
terrorism and allowing for the undermining of fundamental civil
liberties in the name of national security. One of the most
controversial provisions in the 2005 legislation was the creation of
a broad framework for control orders, which authorize the
detention of or significantly curtail the freedom of movement of
those suspected—but not convicted of—terrorism-related activity,
or tendencies toward terrorism-related activity.138 The definition of
terrorism that underpins the use of control orders is the extremely
broad provision created in the Terrorism Act 2000.139
detention and removal powers were inconsistent with Section 4 of the Human
Rights Act, 1998, c.42 (U.K) and the U.K. obligations under Article 14 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. See generally A v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56 (appeal taken from Eng.). Lord Hoffman,
writing on the equal protection issue, noted that:
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in
accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from
terrorism but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what
terrorism may achieve. It is for Parliament to decide whether to give the
terrorists such a victory.
Id. para. 97.
136 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c.2 (U.K.).
137 See BECKMAN, supra note 94, at 72–73 (detailing the divisions and debates
within the governing Labor Party and in the House of Lords regarding the
passage of the 2005 legislation).
138 See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, supra note 136, §§ 1–9 (describing
the framework for authorizing control orders); see also id. § 1(3) (authorizing the
Secretary of State or a court to issue a control order when it is deemed “necessary
for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that
individual in terrorism-related activity”). This extremely vague standard severely
implicates fundamental rights of privacy, dignity and association, and has come
under harsh scrutiny from critics. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LETTER TO THE
UK PARLIAMENT ON CONTROL ORDERS (Mar. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/01/letter-uk-parliament-control-orders
(last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (detailing objections to the renewal of control order
provisions from the 2005 Act).
139 See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.) (defining “terrorism” as the “use
or threat of action” (1) “designed to influence the government or an international
governmental organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the public”;
(2) “made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological
cause”; and (3) which (a) “involves serious violence against a person”; (b)
“involves serious damage to property”; (c) “endangers a person’s life”; (d)
“creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public”; or (e) “is designed
seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system”). The
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After the July 2005 attack on the London transit system,140
pressure mounted on the British government to pass another
round of counterterrorism legislation.141 Again, predicated on the
broad definition of terrorism in the 2000 Act, the Terrorism Act of
2006 sought to extend the range of substantive terrorism offenses
by criminalizing actions such as the “glorification” of terrorist
activity, if such glorification is done with an intent or reckless
disregard as to whether other people will be encouraged to commit
terrorism offenses,142 and distributing a “terrorist publication” to
others.143 Such criminalization authorized the government to
prosecute imams and other Muslim leaders who, according to the
government, fomented the July 2005 transit attackers’ extremism.144
The 2006 Act also authorizes pre-charge detention of up to 28
days145 if an individual is arrested on suspicion of being a
terrorist.146
Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005 relies on
international treaties and conventions, such as those described in section 2, to
provide some parameters for the definition of terrorism. See Council of Europe
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism art. 1(1), June 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. No.
196, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/196.htm
(defining a “terrorist offence” as “any of the offences within the scope of and as
defined in one of the treaties listed in the Appendix”).
140 See HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note at 102 (recounting the events of the
London bombings and noting that, as a result of the four terrorist explosions,
fifty-six people were killed and more than 700 injured).
141 See BECKMAN, supra note 60, at 76 (noting that then-Prime Minister Tony
Blair responded to calls for stricter measures following the London bombings by
laying out a twelve-point counterterrorism plan and subsequently introducing
new legislation in Parliament).
142 Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, §§ 1, 3 (U.K.) (clarifying statements that qualify
as direct or indirect statements of encouragement to commit, prepare, or instigate
acts of terrorism or Convention offenses).
143 Id. § 2.
144 BECKMAN, supra note 94, at 78. See also Alan Cowell, Blair Vows New Laws
to End Sanctuary for Muslim Extremists, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/05/international/europe/05cnd-britain.html
(detailing the August 5, 2005 speech by then-Prime Minister Tony Blair in which
he vowed to remove “extremist” Muslim leaders).
145 This shift to twenty-eight days was extremely controversial as it deviates
from other criminal and counterterrorism standards. For example, the Terrorism
Act, 2000, allowed pre-charge detention to be a maximum of seven days.
Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 41, sch. 8 (U.K.). Fourteen-day pre-charge detention
is allowed under the Criminal Justice Act, 2003. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §
306 (U.K.). Although debate had occurred on increasing the authorized duration
of pre-charge detention to ninety days. See Alexander Horne & Gavin Berman,
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Such measures prompted introspection within the British
government as well as international scrutiny of U.K. legal
standards surrounding terrorism. Critics questioned whether such
lengthy pre-charge detention periods comport with the European
Convention on Human Rights standards for due process.147 The
British government has argued that the United Kingdom is in
compliance with the Convention. The government, however, was
forced to confront the question of whether such draconian
consequences of being suspected of terrorism, when triggered by
the broad definition of terrorism from the 2000 Act, go too far in
curtailing civil liberties and ordinary rule of law protections in the
name of national security.148 The Tory-Liberal Democrats coalition
government that took power in 2010 has made it clear that it plans

Pre-Charge Detention in Terrorism Cases, SN/HA/5634 House of Commons Library,
Home Affairs Section and Social and General Statistics Section 1, 1 (June 29, 2010),
http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05634.pdf [hereinafter 2010 PreCharge Detention Report] (noting that the twenty-eight-day period had initially
been introduced as a compromise from the Government’s original ninety-day
period).
146 Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 23(7) (U.K.) (detailing the extension of the
detention period for suspected terrorists). In June 2009, Parliament conducted its
annual review of the 2006 Act to determine whether the twenty-eight-day precharge detention period ought to be renewed (or allowed under the terms of the
2006 Act to revert to a fourteen-day limit). At that time, since the enactment of the
2006 Act, approximately eleven suspects had been held by the police in pre-charge
detention for twenty-seven to twenty-eight days. Of those, eight were eventually
charged with a crime and three were released. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (FIFTEENTH REPORT):
ANNUAL RENEWAL OF 28 DAYS, 2008-9, H.L. 119, H.C. 726, ¶¶ 14, 20 (U.K.), available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200809/jtselect/jtrights/119
/119.pdf [hereinafter 2009 Annual Renewal Report] (providing an overview of the
government’s statistical support for the extended detention program).
147 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, arts. 5(2), 5(4), Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5 (guaranteeing due process and
a meaningful right to habeas corpus); see also 2010 Pre-Charge Detention Report,
supra note 145, at 5–7 (emphasizing that the twenty-eight day pre-charge
detention period was ultimately decreased to fourteen days in January 2011 due
to the highly controversial nature of the extended period).
148 See 2009 Annual Renewal Report, supra note 146, ¶ 29 (“[W]e remain of the
view that the renewal of the maximum extended period of 28 days risks leading in
practice to breaches of Article 5(4) ECHR.”); see also BLICK, supra note 118, at 48
(noting that critics suggest that this type of pre-arrest detention may violate the
United Kingdom’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights,
unless the United Kingdom chooses to formally derogate from Article 5 of the
Convention based on a national emergency).
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to roll back the authorized pre-charge detention period as well as
numerous other counterterrorism measures.149
The government has also expressed some concern about the
potential reputational damage of harsh counterterrorism
legislation and the poor example it sets for other nations struggling
to maintain the rule of law while implementing robust security
measures. The authors of one parliamentary report commented
that, “[i]t is distressing to see how the slackening of procedural
safeguards in countries like France, the UK and the USA, has been
exploited by other States with less well-entrenched legal systems
and human rights safeguards.”150
U.K. legislation from the 2000 Act onward illustrates two
phenomena.
First, a broad definition of terrorism is now
entrenched. When the 2000 Act was introduced to Parliament, a
robust debate on the protection of human rights, civil liberties, and
the rule of law commenced. Parliament implemented a broad
definition, repurposed and expanded from previous parameters set
up specifically to deal with the troubles in Northern Ireland,
without subsequent revision through the passage of numerous
other counterterrorism laws. Second, each of the post-2000
counterterrorism laws included increasingly punitive measures—
including authorizing the use of control orders, broad immigration
deportation powers and extensive pre-charge detention—
predicated on the same broad definition found in the 2000 Act.
With a system of broad counterterrorism measures that
compromise rights and liberties in significant ways, the British
government is confronted with the question of how and to what
extent structural measures are necessary to safeguard against
government overreaching and abuse.

149 See HOME DEPARTMENT, REVIEW OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SECURITY
POWERS: REVIEW FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 2011, Cm. 8004, at 4–6 (U.K.),
available
at
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm80
/8004/8004.pdf (recommending the overhaul of various counterterrorism
measures, including curtailing the period of pre-charge detention, the use of
control orders, and the scope of authorization for stopping and searching
suspects).
150 2009
Annual Renewal Report, supra note 146, ¶ 31 (quoting
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, ASSESSING DAMAGE, URGING ACTION:
REPORT OF THE EMINENT JURISTS PANEL ON TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 157 (2009), available at http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/EJP-Report.pdf).
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3.2.3. Safeguards Against Abuse
Given the expansive scope and sometimes subjective and
problematic application of the statutory definition of terrorism, the
British Parliament has created several systemic safeguards that
provide some procedural protection.
A one-year renewal
provision is embedded in many statutes, including those that deal
with the definitional parameters of terrorism.151 Further, the
legislation mandates an annual review of all counterterrorism
measures by outside reviewers and parliamentary committees
prior to renewal of the legislation.152
When dealing with statutes such as the ATSCA, which was
passed quickly and increased police powers considerably,
Parliament combined sunset measures with robust review
processes by independent reviewers to provide a substantial check
on potential abuse by the government.153 The more substantial
review required under ATSCA did not extend to the authorization
for issuance of control orders, which must be renewed each year154
but are not subject to the level of external review required under
ATSCA, pursuant to the 2005 Act.
In addition to including sunset measures and the mandate for
parliamentary review, the British government has taken an
additional step by appointing an independent examiner to review
numerous aspects of British counterterrorism law and policy,
including the definition of terrorism itself.155
151 See, e.g., Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 13(1) (U.K.) (“[This Act]
expire[s] at the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which
this Act is passed.”).
152 See, e.g., BECKMAN, supra note 94, at 67 (indicating that the U.K. AntiTerrorism Act of 2000 includes a provision “that mandates that the laws be
reviewed and analyzed each year (i.e., annually) and that a report on the review
be submitted back to the Parliament for reconsideration”).
153 See HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 132, ¶ 40 (requiring an annual
review of detention powers by Parliament that is “based on an annual report by
an independent commissioner”); id. ¶ 43 (requiring the expiration of certain
immigration and detention powers such that it cannot be renewed quickly by
Parliament, but rather would have to be re-enacted as primary legislation by the
full Parliament after five years).
154 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 13(9) (U.K.) (“Nothing in this
Act about the period for which a control order is to have effect or is renewed
enables such an order to continue in force after the provision under which it was
made or last renewed has expired or been repealed by virtue of this section.”).
155 This is a particularly important safeguard, as counterterrorism measures
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In 2005, the U.K. government asked Lord Carlile to examine the
statutory definitions of terrorism to determine whether their scope
and application comported with Parliamentary intent, and to
analyze the definitions’ implications on civil liberties.156 Carlile’s
analysis is expansive, taking into account the history of terrorism’s
definitions in U.K. legislation.157 Carlile began his assessment by
critiquing the definition used in the 1989 legislation dealing with
violence in Northern Ireland: “[T]he use of violence for political
ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting
the public or any section of the public in fear[.]”158
Carlile faulted this definition159 for lacking differentiation
based on the seriousness of the violence and for its exclusion of
acts motivated by non-political purposes (e.g. religious ends).160
He noted that the nature of a terrorist act, in its scope, intent, and
method, is substantially different from an “ordinary” crime.
Therefore, terrorism necessitates extraordinary measures by
intelligence and law enforcement officers.161 Carlile also appears to
have become more robust and the consequences of being labeled a terrorist more
severe. See, e.g., CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶¶ 1–2 (noting that Lord Carlile has
served as an independent reviewer of British counterterrorism legislation and
policy since 2001, and that, in this capacity, he has made several recommendations
to Parliament on the effect of various counterterrorism measures).
156 See id. ¶ 1 (detailing the Parliament’s request to Lord Carlile to write a
report concerning the “definition of terrorism”).
157 See, e.g., Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 4,
Preamble (noting that the legislation was, in part, to replace legislation dealing
with emergency measures for Northern Ireland); id. at pt. VI (detailing legislative
measure specifically for Northern Ireland).
158 Id. § 20(1).
159 Other definitions have been faulted as well. For example, in 1996, Lord
Lloyd of Berwick, a previous independent reviewer, had recommended that the
United Kingdom adopt the operational definition used by the U.S. Federal Bureau
of Investigation at the time: “The use of serious violence against persons or
property, or threat to use such violence, to intimidate or coerce a government, the
public or any section of the public, in order to promote political, social or
ideological objectives.” CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶ 9 (opining that the FBI’s
definition was too narrow, excluding situations such as the “disruption of air
traffic control or other vital electronic systems”).
160 See CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶ 8 (“That definition had major drawbacks . . . .
[I]t was restricted in terms of intention/design, in that it excluded violence for a
religious end, or for a non-political ideological end.”).
161 See CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶¶ 29–31, 39–40 (arguing that although robust
counterterrorism legislation and policies naturally reduce the rights and
protections of individual defendants, the measures are appropriate given the
circumstances, and can be likened to other contexts in which special legal
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equate modern terrorism in the United Kingdom with Islamic
jihadism, particularly noting the jihadist goal of “condemn[ing]
Western society and its value systems,” replacing those systems
with Islamic law, and changing the foreign policies of nations.162
Given the expansive scope of the definition of terrorism and its
perceived orientation toward Islamic jihadism, Carlile considers
recommendations for certain exceptions to the definition of
terrorism to improve protection for defendants’ rights. He
analyzes arguments regarding the exclusion of “offences against
property,” “offences for a religious purpose” because of the
difficulty in defining religion precisely, offenses “lacking a
sufficient political or ideological component/motive,” “mere
preaching or glorification” of terrorist activity, and freedom
fighting against an oppressive regime.163 He also considers
whether state actors should be considered within the framework of
counterterrorism legislation.164
These concerns and tensions almost exactly parallel the debates
that continue to plague efforts to reach an international consensus
on the definition of terrorism. Yet, ultimately, Lord Carlile rejects
all of them,165 despite noting problematic labeling, such as the
measures are already taken, such as “drug dealing and serious fraud”).
162 See CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶¶ 32–34 (considering whether other types of
criminal behavior, including that of Theodore Kaczynski (a.k.a. the “Unabomber”)
and “extreme animal rights activists,” ought to fall under the legal framework of
“terrorism”). Carlile concludes, ultimately, that such individuals are not
“terrorists” for the purposes of intelligence and law enforcement, and are
appropriately treated as ordinary criminals, primarily because ordinary law
enforcement measures can effectively deal with such actors, whereas those same
measures would be inadequate to deal with terrorists such as Islamic jihadists.
Id.; cf. Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantánamo: Rights at the Brink of
Dehumanization, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1683, 1697 (2009) (arguing that the “racialized
social construction” of an uncommonly dangerous Arab or Muslim terrorist was
created by counterterrorism policies in the post 9/11 context). Racial or religious
profiling based on the perception of the extraordinary threat of Islamic terrorism
has pervaded some U.S. counterterrorism efforts, much to the detriment of
establishing trust with the discontented communities being affected. See, e.g.,
Eileen Sullivan, AP IMPACT: NYPD Spied on City’s Muslim Partners, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/apimpact-nypd-spied-citys-muslim-partners-14674817.
163 CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶ 48.
164 See CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶¶ 83–84 (discussing that although no one
should be above the law, the issue is one of jurisdiction and not definition).
165 See CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶¶ 50–54 (rejecting objections that the label of
terrorism is inappropriately applied to offenses against property, offenses
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inclusion of Nelson Mandela on a government-issued list of
terrorists.166 Not only does Carlile recommend maintaining the
status quo with regard to the definition of terrorism, but he further
argues that terrorism-related convictions ought to carry harsher
penalties.167 Carlile also suggests that any abuse of expansive
police and prosecutorial powers related to terrorism can be
resolved without modifying its threshold definition.168
The
government agreed with almost all of Carlile’s conclusions169 and

committed in the name of religion, and offenses that do not contain a significant
political or ideological component); id. ¶ 72 (upholding the inclusion of
glorification of terrorist activity as “terrorism,” although voicing some concern
based on the application of this type of criminalization stretching back to Henry
II’s execution of Priest Becket in 1164); id. ¶¶ 77–78 (rejecting the exclusion of
freedom fighters from the label of “terrorism” based on the European Union
mandate that member states adopt a “zero-tolerance” approach to terrorism); id.
¶¶ 84–85 (rejecting the inclusion of state actors in the definition of terrorism based
on complications with foreign relations and diplomatic immunity).
166 Nelson Mandela was removed from the Terrorist Watch List in 2008 as a
result of presidential decree. Mandela Taken Off US Terror List, BBC NEWS, July 1,
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7484517.stm. Menachem Begin was also listed
as a terrorist for his actions against the British regime in the early 1940s. See
Theodore P. Seto, The Morality of Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1227, 1227–29
(2002) (listing all of Menachem Begin’s transgressions).
167 See CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶ 86(8) (recommending new and additional
sentencing powers for criminal activity that is “aggravated by the intention to
facilitate or assist a terrorist”).
168 Carlile takes on one of the most difficult questions posed by the use of a
broad and sweeping definition of terrorism: are law enforcement officers
appropriately exercising their discretion when deciding to try a defendant as a
terrorist, with the concomitant rights reductions that are entailed in such a
designation, as opposed to an ordinary criminal? Carlile finds that the layers of
review and code of ethics within the Crown Prosecutor’s office, along with the
protections of a jury trial for defendants, offer sufficient protections against
selective or biased prosecution. See CARLILE, supra note 37, ¶¶ 60–62 (stating the
parties involved in prosecution as follows: the police, the Crown Prosecution
Service, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Attorney General, potentially the
judiciary through judicial review, and the jury); see also id. ¶ 63 (explaining that
any impropriety by the Attorney General, who oversees the Director of Public
Prosecutions, can be controlled by Parliament).
169 See HOME DEPARTMENT, THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM: THE GOVERNMENT
REPLY TO THE REPORT BY LORD CARLILE OF BERRIEW Q.C. INDEPENDENT REVIEWER OF
TERRORISM LEGISLATION, 2007, Cm. 7058, ¶¶ 1–10, 12–16 (U.K.) (accepting nearly
all of Lord Carlile’s conclusions). The only point of disagreement with Carlile’s
recommendations was that the Government did not think it necessary to clarify
the definition of terrorism to include an intent requirement of intimidation. Id. ¶
11 (emphasis in original) (“We do not consider that the bar is set too low by the
use of the word influence [as opposed to intimidate].”).
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Parliament soon thereafter made changes to comport with most of
Carlile’s recommendations.170
Carlile’s analysis was extensive and included input from the
military, law enforcement officers, intelligence agencies, Muslim
community groups, human rights organizations, and others. This
undertaking, although not resulting in greater substantive rights
protections, provides one level of procedural fairness in the sense
that the shifting legislative definitions of terrorism are going
neither unnoticed nor unchecked.
Carlile’s conclusions,
particularly those that seem to focus counterterrorism efforts on
Islamic jihadist groups, may only serve to alienate British Muslims
Nonetheless, the institutional
and other outsider groups.171
element of undertaking such an independent review is valuable
because it demonstrates that Parliament is cognizant of the
potentially harsh effects of being considered a “terrorist.” It has
responded to the potential abuses of the definition by reassessing
such legislation in a meaningful and comprehensive way.
3.3. India
India’s struggle with issues concerning national security has
been ongoing since its independence in 1947.172 India’s legal
response to those struggles has been characterized by a heavy
reliance on constitutionally and statutorily granted emergency
powers.173 India also depends on robust non-emergency criminal

170 E.g., Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 34 (U.K.) (amending the definition of the
word “terrorism” by adding after the word government “or an international
governmental organisation”).
171 See DONOHUE, supra note 80, at 26–27 (describing how the alienation of
British Muslims in the post 9/11 era is partly a result of disparate treatment under
counterterrorism laws and the perception of a distortion in the application of the
rule of law).
172 See Anil Kalhan et al., Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism and
Security Laws in India, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93, 99 (2006) (describing violence
related to terrorism as a “chronic crisis of national security”); see generally K.R.
GUPTA, ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS: INDIA, THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND ISRAEL (2002) (chronicling the history and development of “anti-terrorism
legislation” in India).
173 See INDIA CONST. arts. 352–56, amended by The Constitution (Ninety-fourth
Amendment) Act, 2006 (stating the emergency powers provisions); see also
GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY OF THE
INDIAN EXPERIENCE 295–97 (2003) (discussing the era of Emergency Rule under
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi).
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laws that authorize broad police powers and significantly curtail
defendant’s rights in a manner strikingly similar to that of
emergency powers.174
3.3.1. History of Security Legislation
The robust police and intelligence-gathering powers granted to
the Indian government in various statutes arise from a long history
of the granting of such powers. The powers also come from a
history of dealing with the terrorist/freedom-fighter duality.
Being labeled a “terrorist” can often have an augmenting effect to a
criminal cause, as such individuals are lauded as heroes and role
models in some disaffected communities within India.175
Security policies, regulations, and laws have been part of the
governance of India since the East India Company176 established
rules for dealing with separatists and seditionists in 1793.177
174 See Kalhan et al., supra note 172, at 116–17 (arguing that Article 22 of the
Indian Constitution provides that those arrested “must be provided the basis for
arrest ‘as soon as may be’ and produced before a magistrate within 24 hours”).
However, Article 22(3) of the Constitution allows the central and state
governments to enact preventive detention laws during non-emergency times and
contains a carve-out such that a person arrested or detained under preventive
detention laws need not be brought before a “magistrate within 24 hours of being
taken into custody[,]” nor does the detainee have the right to counsel or to be
informed of grounds for arrest. Id. at 135 (citing INDIA CONST. art. 22(3), amended
by The Constitution (Ninety-fourth Amendment) Act, 2006).
175 See Madan Singh v. State of Bihar, (2004) 3 S.C.R. 692, 705 (India) (noting
that “by wearing the cloak of terrorism, [criminals] aim to achieve acceptability
and respectability in the society”); see also Schmid, supra note 12, at 389, 414
(discussing the distinction between terming violent attacks as freedom-fighting
versus terrorism).
176 The East India Company, under Royal Charter from the British
Government, had administrative and military control over parts of India from the
middle of the eighteenth century until 1858. Administrative control over India
was officially transferred from the East India Company to the British government
through the Government of India Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106 (Eng.) following
the First War of Independence in India, also referred to as the Sepoy Mutiny of
1857. Many of the regulations used by the Company during their rule in the
previous 100 years were simply adopted by Parliament and their enforcement was
unchanged by the shift in political, administrative, and military control. See
generally SUGATA BOSE & AYESHA JALAL, MODERN SOUTH ASIA: HISTORY, CULTURE,
POLITICAL ECONOMY (2d ed. 2004); AUSTIN, supra note 173.
177 CM Abraham, India—An Overview, in PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND
SECURITY LAW: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 59, 60 (Andrew Harding & John Hatchard,
eds., 1993) (discussing preventive-detention and security measures taken as early
as 1784 by representatives of the East India Company).
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Regulations allowed for preventive detention—even without
grounds for trial—for state security reasons. This same preventive
detention system has been modified over the years and continues
to be used by the Indian government in modern times.178
During colonial rule, numerous ordinances and regulations
allowed for extraordinary measures to be taken in the name of
national or governmental security, even in times of nonemergency.179 In 1950, the Indian Constitution enshrined the
government’s ability to utilize emergency powers,180 which
continued to be used widely in the post-independence era, when
the government relied on emergency powers to deal with external
threats from China and Pakistan.181
Non-emergency and emergency powers were used to combat
internal security threats during the 1970s and early 1980s. Yet even
the non-emergency criminal provisions included expansive police
powers, such as the power to preventively detain suspects for
prolonged periods182 and freeze assets of those organizations
deemed to be “unlawful.”183

178 See Kalhan et al., supra note 172, at 127–28 (noting in recent years, under
TADA and POTA, the government has maintained preventive detention centers).
179 E.g., Indian Councils Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 67; Government of India
Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 101; Government of India Act, 1935, 26 Geo. 5, c. 2
(authorizing the appointed Governor-General to issue ordinances if necessary to
preserve national security in the face of external or internal threats).
180 See INDIA CONST. arts. 352–56, amended by The Constitution (Ninety-fourth
Amendment) Act, 2006 (delineating emergency powers provisions).
181 See M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 679–80 (5th ed. reprint 2008)
(2003) (describing the invocation of Article 352 in the context of military conflicts
with China and Pakistan).
182 See, e.g., The National Security Act, 1980, No. 65, Acts of Parliament, 1980,
§§ 1, 13 (India) (describing the Act’s objective as “to provide for preventive
detention in certain cases and for matters connected therewith,” and allows for
preventive detention for up to 12 months in certain cases).
183 See, e.g., The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37, Acts of
Parliament, 1967, § 7 (India) (describing the terms under which “funds of an
unlawful association” can be prohibited). Far-reaching legislation, such as the
UAPA and the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (1970), set a framework for
harsh treatment and penalties for criminal acts related to external and internal
security, but did not attempt to define terrorism for the purpose of criminalizing
the substantive acts in question.
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3.3.2. Defining Terrorism
In the period after Emergency Rule ended in India, political
and economic instability, exacerbated by security threats, kept the
Indian polity in a state of extreme upheaval.184 In the 1980s the
Punjabi separatist movement fueled government fears that
violence would spread and separatist movements throughout
India would gain strength.185 The fears motivated the Parliament
to pass the Terrorist Affected Areas Act of 1984 (TAAA), which
granted more structured and comprehensive police and
intelligence-gathering powers.186 This statute contains the first
legislative definition of a “terrorist,” which requires that a person
kills, acts violently, disrupts essential services, or damages
property; with the purpose of intimidating the public, coercing the
government, endangering the sovereignty or integrity of India, or
“affecting adversely the harmony between different religious,
racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities.”187
This extraordinarily broad language is mitigated by two
factors: first, like the U.K. legislation governing conflicts in
Northern Ireland, the legislation is limited to particular areas of
conflict designated by the government.188 Second, the substance of
TAAA focuses on the establishment and use of special, expedited
courts for trying suspected terrorists in designated “affected
areas.”189 Although using special courts for suspected terrorists
raises important due process and rule of law issues,190 TAAA’s

184 See AUSTIN, supra note 173, at 295–97 (detailing the reaction to
authoritarian rule during the Emergency).
185 The government’s fear of Sikh separatists gaining strength fueled the illconceived Operation Bluestar attack on Sikhs in Amritsar in 1984.
186 See Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984, No. 61, Acts of
Parliament, 1984 (India) [hereinafter TAAA] (“An act to provide for the speedy
trial of certain offences in terrorist affected areas and for matters connected
therewith.”).
187 See id. § 2(1)(h) (noting that this definition of a terrorist could, if applied
indiscriminately or subjectively, cover many legitimate activities related to
business or free expression).
188 See id. § 3 (designating “affected areas”).
189 See id. §§ 4–16 (establishing rules, procedures, and jurisdiction of the
special courts).
190 See Setty, supra note 3, at 164–70 (discussing the historical use of
specialized courts in India and the accompanying curtailment of suspected
terrorists’ procedural rights).
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limited geographic and procedural scope curtailed, to some extent,
concerns about civil rights and constitutional infringement.191
However, as is evident in other domestic counterterrorism
contexts, the definition of terrorism was quickly repurposed and its
application was broadened vastly. In the wake of the assassination
of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) was passed in 1985.192 This
new act defined terrorism in largely the same terms as TAAA.193
The geographic and situational limitations that limited the civil
liberties implications of TAAA, however, were lifted, such that the
definition of terrorism and the concomitant police powers it
granted were expanded to all of India.194 TADA also resurrected
robust police powers and measures drawn out of the emergency

191 See Kalhan et al., supra note 172, at 145 (noting that substantive offenses
are only categorized as acts of terrorism if they occur in certain regions, under the
TAAA).
192 See The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985, No. 31,
Acts of Parliament, 1985 (India) [hereinafter TADA] (“An act to make special
provisions for the prevention of, and for coping with, terrorist and disruptive
activities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.”).
193 Part II of the TADA adds detail to the manner of attack or threat contained
within TAAA’s definition of terrorism:

Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established
or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate
any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst
different sections of the people does any act or thing by using bombs,
dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or
firearms or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other
chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of
a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to cause,
death of, or injuries to, any person or persons or damage to, or
destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies or services
essential to the life of the community, commits a terrorist act.
See id. § (3)(1).
194 Although TADA was initially enacted with a carve-out for Jammu and
Kashmir, it was quickly amended to apply to all regions of India. See Kartar Singh
v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 569, 635 (India) (holding that the 1985 TADA,
among other acts, “fall[s] within the legislative competence of Parliament in view
of Article 248”); see also The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,
1987, No. 28, Acts of Parliament, 1987, Part I, §1(2) (India) [hereinafter TADA 1987
Amendments] (amending TADA to expand the statute’s jurisdiction to cover all of
India, Indian citizens throughout the world, employees of the Indian government,
and passengers on “ships and aircraft registered in India”); Kalhan et al., supra
note 172, at 100 (noting that the 1987 version of TADA was renewed repeatedly
until it was allowed to expire in 1995).
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period and earlier, such as allowing coerced confessions by police
officers to be used against defendants in the special courts,195 and
increasing the penalties for those convicted of terrorist or
disruptive acts.196
The constitutionality of TADA, including that of its vague and
broad definition of terrorism,197 was upheld by the Indian courts
with some reservations about the limitation of rights and potential
abuse of power.198 In validating the scope and jurisdiction of the
definition of terrorism, without close examination of its impact or
the original intent of the legislation, the courts cemented the right
of the government to use such definitions, even after TADA
expired in 1995.199
195 See TADA 1987 Amendments, supra note 194, pt. III, § 15 (considering
specific kinds of confessions made to police officers).
196 See TADA 1987 Amendments, supra note 194, pt. II, § 6 (describing
enhanced penal provisions).
197 The TADA definition of terrorism is broad, vague, and subject to much
criticism. See e.g., Kalhan et al., supra note 172, at 225 (recommending that the
Indian government “narrow the definitions of substantive terrorism-related
offenses under UAPA to eliminate vagueness”). However, the Act was not found
to be a defeating measure for those convicted pursuant to the statute. See Madan
Singh v. State of Bihar, (2004) 3 S.C.R. 692 (India) (observing that it is not possible
to provide a precise definition of terrorism).
198 See Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 2 S.C.R. 375 (India) (upholding
the constitutionality of TADA, but in recognition of its potential problems,
establishing guidelines to be followed by police offers in recording a confession).
Along the same lines as the critique of the material support statute in the United
States, the Indian Supreme Court has expressed some concern about the
vagueness of the intent requirement when showing that a defendant has aided
and abetted a terrorist act. Notwithstanding such concern, the Indian Supreme
Court has upheld the relevant provisions of TADA and POTA. Id.; see also V.
Vijayakumar, Legal and Institutional Responses to Terrorism in India, in GLOBAL ANTITERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 351, 353 (Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2005) (indicating
that although the Supreme Court observed the application of TADA to political
opponents and petty criminals, for example, it upheld the constitutionality of the
legislation “in spite of the sweeping powers given to the authorities”).
199 Various groups objected to the long-lasting effect of TADA on the
counterterrorism landscape in India. For example, the National Human Rights
Commission (NHRC), established in 1994 by The Protection of Human Rights Act,
1993, No. 10, Acts of Parliament, 1994 (India), objected to the renewals of TADA
and, in the 1990s, argued that “any worthwhile strategy to combat insurgency and
terrorism requires strong citizen support[,]” which can be achieved by dialogue
with the respective societies affected by the acts of terrorism. NAT’L HUMAN
RIGHTS COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1996–1997). The NHRC further noted that
that the registration of over 250 allegations of abuse and misuse by security forces,
and India’s obligations to adhere to international human rights standards, should
give pause to the police powers granted under any future counterterrorism
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TADA’s definition of terrorism was reused and broadened
with the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002
(POTA),200 passed partially in response to the Resolution 1373
global mandate to fight terrorism.201 Although POTA was repealed
as part of a political pledge to deal with human rights abuses by
police and intelligence forces,202 many of the substantive provisions
regarding the treatment of terrorism suspects were incorporated
into amendments to the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act
(UAPA),203 thereby edging counterterrorism legislation closer to
colonial and Emergency-era provisions that provided a framework
for criminalizing seditious and disruptive activities.204 The Indian
Supreme Court continued its deferential stance toward such
legislation, validating the broad exercise of police powers because
of the compelling state interest in counterterrorism without
legislation. Id. at 10–12.
200 See The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15, Acts of Parliament,
2002 (India) Chapter II, § 3(1)(a), for a definition of perpetrator of a terrorist act as
one who:
[W]ith intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of
India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people does
any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or explosive substances or
inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisons
or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances . . . of a
hazardous nature or by any other means whatsoever, in such a manner
as to cause . . . death of, or injuries to any persons or loss of, or damage to
. . . property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life
of the community . . . .
Id.
201 See V. Venkatesan, The POTA Passage, FRONTLINE, vol. 19, issue 8, Apr. 13,
2002, at 13 (noting that various cabinet ministers had encouraged the passage of
POTA in parliamentary debates based on the mandate of Resolution 1373, and
that even opposition groups eventually voted to pass POTA as a result of these
pressures).
202 Repeal of “Anti-democratic” Laws Sought, THE HINDU, Aug. 7, 2004,
http://www.hindu.com/2004/08/07/stories/2004080707001100.htm (describing
the misuse of POTA, TADA, and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA),
especially in Manipur and Bihar's Jehanabad district).
203 The 2004 UAPA amendments included incorporating a definition of
terrorism, which was not a part of the original 1967 legislation. The 2004
definition largely paralleled the POTA definition. See The Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Amendment Ordinance, 2004, No. 2, § 15, Acts of Parliament, 2004
(India) (defining “terrorist act”).
204 See generally Kalhan, supra note 172 (focusing on the underlying continuity
between colonial-era provisions and modern police powers and counterterrorism
laws).

52

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:1

examining the definition of terrorism on which those powers were
predicated.205
The most recent set of counterterrorism laws were enacted after
a three-day terrorist attack in Mumbai in late November 2008, in
which 163 people were killed.206 Outrage among the Indian public
led to demands for stronger national security and antiterrorism
measures.207 In response, Parliament rapidly passed the National
Investigation Agency Act (NIA Act)208 and further amendments to
the UAPA.209 These Acts broadened police powers210 and curtailed
civil liberties at trials in the newly reinstated special courts211 in
ways that are identical to POTA provisions that Parliament had
rejected in its legislative repeal four years earlier.212
However, the effect of the new legislation is actually broader
and more prone to abuse because of the definition of terrorism on
which the new police and intelligence powers are predicated. The
205 See People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, 6 (Supp.) S.C.R.
860, 880 (2004) (India) (upholding the constitutionality of the Prevention of
Terrorism Act, 2002, and noting that, on policy grounds, it was not permitted to
“go into and examine the ‘need’” for the act). The Court further observed that the
Government “has an obligation to exercise all available options to prevent
terrorism within the bounds of the Constitution,” and that the “mere possibility of
abuse cannot be counted as a ground for denying the vesting of powers or for
declaring a statute unconstitutional.” Id.
206 See Somini Sengupta, In Mumbai Transcripts, an Attack Directed from Afar,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at A5 (describing intercepted communication detailing
the preparations of the attacks).
207 See Somini Sengupta & Keith Bradsher, India Faces a Reckoning as Terror
Toll Eclipses 170, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, at A1 (questioning whether Indian
authorities could have better anticipated the terrorist attack and ensured
heightened security).
208 See National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, No. 34, Acts of Parliament,
2008 (India) (creating an “investigation agency at the national level” to handle
security issues).
209 See Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008, No. 35, Acts
of Parliament, 2008 (India) [hereinafter UAPA 2008 Amendments].
210 See Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008, No. 35, §
43D(2)(a-b), Acts of Parliament, 2008 (India) (authorizing prolonged preventive
detention); see also id. § 43D(5–7) (limiting access to bail for pre-trial detainees).
211 These changes to trial procedures included shifting the burden of proof to
the defendant in some cases, id. § 16(1), using summary trials, id. § 16(2), and
allowing the court to proceed without the defendant in attendance. Id. § 16(5). In
a regular criminal proceeding, the accused is protected by The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, Act No. 2 of 1974, § 273 (India), which requires evidence to be
taken by a court only when the accused is present.
212 See National Investigation Agency Act, supra note 208, ch. IV.
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2008 UAPA amendments broaden the definition of a terrorist act
from the previous definition used in POTA, so that acts “likely to
cause” the type of damage contemplated in the POTA-era
legislation are now also considered to be “terrorist acts.”213
Although such measures may seem extraordinary, the history
of Indian legislation against perceived security threats serves as a
reminder that many individual elements of current
counterterrorism legislation can trace their roots directly back to
the colonial era. The burden-shifting provision in the 2008 UAPA
amendments, for example, was not only part of POTA, but can be
found a century earlier in 1908 legislation dealing with explosive
substances.214 However, as the government introduced these
measures into Parliament in 2008, it did not hearken back to the
213 The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Ordinance, supra note
203, § 15. The specific definition is as follows:

Whoever, with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or
sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the
people in India or in any foreign country, does any act by using
[weapons as described in the POTA definition], in such a manner as to
cause, or likely to cause, death of, or injuries to any person or persons or
loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or [other damage to
infrastructure and defense], or detains any person and threatens to kill or
injure such person in order to compel the Government in India or the
Government of a foreign country or any other person to do or abstain
from doing any act, commits a terrorist act.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Repeating the Mistakes of the Past, HUMAN RIGHTS
DOCUMENTATION CENTER (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc
/hrfeatures/HRF191.htm (noting that this definition institutionalizes the worst
overreaching and missteps from TADA and POTA because it relates not only to
counterterrorism policy, but to other “disruptive” activities).
214 The Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Act No. 6 of 1908 (India). Under this
Act, if a person knowingly possesses or controls an explosive substance and the
police have a “reasonable suspicion” that the possession is for unlawful purposes,
the burden shifts to the defendant to prove lawfulness. If he is unable to do so
and is, therefore, convicted, punishment is penal transportation for up to 14 years,
plus the possibility of a fine being imposed. Id. § 5. The Explosive Substances Act
also provides for punishing material support to the same degree as the offense
itself. Id. § 6. Likewise, the authority for warrantless wiretapping found in the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, supra note 209, finds its roots
in colonial legislation from 1885. See The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, Act No. 13
of 1885, § 5 (India) (noting that telegraph messages may be intercepted and kept
by the central or state governments in times of “public emergency, or in the
interest of the public safety” if it is deemed necessary or expedient to do so “in the
interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement
to the commission of an offence”).
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colonial and Emergency-era history of India; instead, it claimed
that these measures were a necessary step in India’s obligations to
fight terrorism under international mandates such as Resolution
1373.215
As the law currently stands, India has used the leverage of the
mandate under Resolution 1373 to implement or reinstate
counterterrorism measures that are problematic on a number of
fronts. First, the definition of terrorism on which the measures are
based is extremely broad and subjective, making the potential for
government abuse high.216 Second, many of the substantive
provisions in the UAPA 2008 Amendments had been previously
rejected based on concerns over human rights abuses, including
the targeting of Muslim populations and other groups without
Third, although TADA and POTA both
political power.217
215 See Statement of Objects and Reasons of Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Amendment Bill, supra note 209. Here, the government noted the concerns over
human rights abuses under previous counterterrorism legislation, but stated that:

[K]eeping in view that India has been a front-runner in the global fight
against terrorism, its commitments in terms of the United Nations
Security Council Resolution, 1373 dated 28th September, 2001 and the
resolve not to allow any compromise in the fight against terrorism, the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was amended to make
provisions to deal with terrorism and terrorist activities.
Id. (statement of P. Chidambaram).
216 See Kalhan, supra note 172, at 181–98 (detailing various problems in the
application of counterterrorism laws by the police and intelligence forces,
including violations of political speech and associational rights, malicious
prosecution of non-terrorism related crimes under terrorism statutes against
disfavored social groups, police misconduct, and threats against defense and
human rights lawyers).
217 Critics of TADA and POTA often noted that Muslims were prosecuted
severely under these statutes, whereas Hindus accused of the same acts were
often not prosecuted or charged with ordinary criminal offenses that carried
lighter sentences upon conviction. See Amos Guiora, Legislative and Policy
Responses to Terrorism, A Global Perspective, 7 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 125, 171 (2005)
(noting that some described POTA as a “terrorist law [that would be] . . . used to
terrorise minorities”); see also Sudha Ramachandran, Filling India’s Anti-terrorism
Void,
ASIA
TIMES
ONLINE,
Sept.
23,
2004,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FI23Df03.html (noting that while
the majority of the 32 organizations banned under POTA were Muslim, none of
the Hindu extremist groups were ever targeted); Sachin Mehta, Repeal of POTA
Justified,
LEGAL
SERVICES
INDIA,
http://www.legalservicesindia.com
/articles/pota.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (observing that POTA had been
“abused to book, without lucidity and accountability, political opponents and
underprivileged communities”).
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contained sunset provisions meant to provide at least some
legislative check on the powers exercised by police and intelligence
forces, the 2008 UAPA amendments do not contain similar
protections. Finally, the 2008 UAPA amendments do not require
any meaningful judicial scrutiny of the prosecutor’s decision—and
the central government’s review authority—as to whether
detainees will be categorized as ordinary criminals or treated as
terrorism suspects who are then afforded many fewer rights.218
4.

DEFINITIONS WITHIN A COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The arc of post-September 11 counterterrorism policy at the
United Nations is one in which the initial drive to mandate robust
counterterrorism measures affected domestic policies deeply, and
it was tempered only years later with reminders to member states
of their human rights obligations under international law. This lag
in emphasizing the rights aspect of counterterrorism efforts was
costly in terms of creating the political space for domestic laws that
are vague, subjective, and allow for potential abuses.
Part of the post-September 11 shift in domestic definitions of
terrorism is attributable to domestic political forces and the
legitimate need to reassess the efficacy of counterterrorism law and
policy in light of the attacks that had occurred. However, domestic
forces offer only part of the explanation for the changes. The broad
mandate of Resolution 1373 and the lack of a comprehensive
General Assembly definition of terrorism created pressure for
domestic action and leverage for political actors to push through
controversial legislation in the name of international compliance,219
See Repeating the Mistakes of the Past, supra note 213.
For example, in India, proponents of strong antiterrorism legislation used
the mandate from Resolution 1373 to push through the 2001 Prevention of
Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) and the 2002 Prevention of Terrorism Act. Notably,
POTO had been in the works, through the Indian Law Commission and other
channels, since 2000. See LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, 173RD REPORT ON PREVENTION OF
TERRORISM BILL, ANNEXURE II § 30, 33 (2000) (containing provisions similar to
those found in POTA regarding the extension of preventive detention and
arrested suspects’ access to legal counsel); see also Sudha Setty, No More Secret
Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists
Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579, 615–16 (2009) (discussing the history of POTA, and
explaining that the Indian Law Commission’s report was “an early iteration of
some of the POTA policies”). There had been significant opposition to the
adoption of POTO based on human rights concerns related to similar powers
218
219
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regardless of whether such legislation fostered potential abuses of
discretion and the poor treatment of socially disfavored groups.220
After the benefit of several years of experience with member
states’ actions in the “war on terror,” the United Nations
established rights-oriented structural mechanisms,221 made clear
that counterterrorism measures had to take into account the
human rights of individual nations,222 and, more recently, created a
granted under TADA. Politicians and government officials cited the need to
comply with Resolution 1373 as an incentive for the passage of this legislation
over the objections of human rights groups. See Press Release, Government of
India, Press Brief on Chief Minister’s Conference on Internal Security (Nov. 17,
2001) (describing the Home Minister’s response to critics of POTO, observing that
“UN Resolution 1373 mandated follow up legislation to give effect to the
provisions of the Resolution and some provisions of this law were in part
implementation of the UN Resolution”). As such, the passage of POTO represents
an instance of a state “us[ing] terrorist incidents to pursue agendas that reach far
beyond the immediate threat.” DONOHUE, supra note 80, at 15. On the
transnational front, India and the United States used Resolution 1373 as a
springboard for mutual cooperation in increasing intelligence-sharing and in
providing additional technological resource to Indian intelligence officials. See
Press Release, Embassy of India, Joint Statement of the India-U.S. Joint Working
Group on Counterterrorism (July 12, 2002) (detailing the cooperative efforts
between the United States and India, including the following directives: exchange
of information, strengthened intelligence, a mutual assistance treaty, and other
initiatives on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373).
220 For example, the Indian National Human Rights Commission’s (NHRC)
objections—that The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance of 2000 would lead to
gross human rights abuses and contravene India’s obligations under international
human rights standards—were overwhelmed by the political pressure to enact
new legislation after Resolution 1373 was passed. See Vijayakumar, supra note
198, at 356–57 (noting that the NHRC rejected the need for new counterterrorism
legislation in 2000 in light of existing criminal laws that were sufficient to cover all
of the relevant substantive acts could be prosecuted).
221 See S.C. Res. 1535, ¶ 1-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1535 (Mar. 26, 2004)
(establishing the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, a
committee with a proactive obligation to ensure that human rights concerns were
being met by member states attempting to comply with the mandate of Resolution
1373); see also Protecting Human Rights While Countering Terrorism, COUNTERTERRORISM COMM., http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/rights.html (last updated June
20, 2011) (clarifying that, although human rights law is outside the scope of the
Counter-Terrorism Committee’s (CTC) mandate, the CTC remains aware of
human rights concerns, and explaining that both the CTC and the CTC Executive
Directorate should incorporate human rights into their communications strategies
as part of their mission to support compliance with Resolution 1373).
222 See S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 2, ¶ 6 (making clear that nations are
obligated to ensure that “any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all
their obligations under international law . . . in particular international human
rights, refugee, and humanitarian law”). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1624
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working group to consider ways in which member states can be
effectively
encouraged
to
harmonize
their
coexisting
223
counterterrorism and human rights obligations.
The United Nations’ shifting emphasis toward human rights
reflects several priorities: the deontological imperative to protect
individuals from overreaching and abusive governments; the need
to remind nations of their international obligations under the
Geneva Conventions and the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights;224 and a pragmatic view of counterterrorism,
since governmental abuse of human rights and the targeting of
disaffected minority groups results in mistrust of the government
and alienation in those groups most likely to be sympathetic to the
cause of terrorists.225
Yet the nations examined here have not all followed the
trajectory of the United Nations toward focusing on strengthening
security measures and rights protection simultaneously. Each of
these nations has broadened its definitions of terrorism and the
scope of the application of those definitions.226 In the United
likewise emphasizes the need to respect human rights in counterterrorism
operations. See S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 34, ¶ 5 (expressing deep concern about
the importance of upholding human rights obligations when implementing
counterterrorism measures).
223 See S.C. Res. 1805, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1805 (Mar. 20, 2008) (affirming
the CTC’s endorsement of the “Organizational plan for the Counter-Terrorism
Executive Directorate”); see also Rosand, supra note 52, at 340 (creating a working
group to focus on human rights issues in the context of domestic counterterrorism
efforts).
224 All of the nations examined in this Article are signatories to both
conventions.
225 See U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All, ¶¶ 140–47, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005)
(detailing the importance of human rights in combating terrorism). Then
Secretary-General Kofi Annan opined:
It would be a mistake to treat human rights as though there were a tradeoff to be made between human rights and such goals as security or
development. We only weaken our hand in fighting the horrors of
extreme poverty or terrorism if, in our efforts to do so, we deny the very
human rights that these scourges take away from citizens. Strategies
based on the protection of human rights are vital for both our moral
standing and the practical effectiveness of our actions.
Id. ¶ 140.
226 See DONOHUE, supra note 80, at 15 (describing how counterterrorist
measures create an institutional interest such that government agencies once
entrusted with expansive powers are always reluctant to give up those powers).
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States, several legal developments paint a picture of a continuing
trend away from rights protection. First, the Patriot Act definition
of terrorism broadens its scope and application. Second, the 2006
vote that made the amendments permanent and removed the
sunset provisions in the legislation essentially cemented a broad
and arguably vague definition of terrorism. Third, recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence makes clear that the Court will defer to
executive and legislative conceptions of terrorism, however
vague,227 and concomitantly limit the availability of remedies to
individual plaintiffs when potential abuses of power are alleged.228
Similarly, definitional creep has occurred in India. The original
justifications for broad definitions—such as the limited application
of the definition to a particular situation for a limited period of
time in a case of genuine Emergency—no longer exist in the law.
Instead, Indian legislation has seen ever-broadening definitions of
terrorism with the removal of sunset provisions and procedural
safeguards. Although the Indian government claims that misuse
will not be tolerated,229 abuse has been rampant under vague
parameters in laws like TADA and POTA, and the subjectivity of
prosecutorial and investigative decision-making in the application
of the statutes makes them ripe for overreaching and misuse.230
The discourse regarding the justifications for broadly written
legislation has become less resonant, as such measures are seen as
necessary to comply with international mandates, and are
normalized within society as national security crises continue to
occur.
227 See Said, supra note 97, at 580–82 (explaining the expansion of the
definition for terrorist organization).
228 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (holding that generalized
pleadings regarding alleged governmental abuses motivated by religious animus
were insufficient to meet the notice pleading standard articulated in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and as described in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
229 See, e.g., Human Rights Violations Will Not Be Tolerated in Jammu and
Kashmir:
Manmohan,
THE
HINDU,
June
7,
2010,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article448962.ece (quoting Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as stating, “the government policy is to protect
the human rights of the people even when dealing with terrorism . . . . We will act
to remove any deficiency in the implementation of [this policy]”).
230 Setty, supra note 3, at 167–70 (detailing human rights concerns related to
the application and enforcement of TADA, POTA, and the 2008 UAPA
amendments).
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Like the United States and India, British counterterrorism law
has undergone a serious transformation in the last two decades,
particularly since the September 11 attacks in the United States and
the July 2005 attacks in London. The definition of terrorism has
been broadened and repurposed from the limited context of
Emergency provisions for Northern Ireland to the Terrorism Act of
2000, which applied generally and was further expanded by later
legislation. This pattern paralleled the United States’ shift in
definition from the limited FISA context to the broad Patriot Act
context, and the Indian shift from the limited application of TAAA
to the broad applicability of police and intelligence powers in
TADA and all subsequent counterterrorism legislation.
However, compared with the United States and India, the
United Kingdom has maintained at least some check on potential
abuses of power associated with a broad definition of terrorism by
continuing the mandatory renewal provisions for counterterrorism
legislation, utilizing—and taking seriously—the recommendations
of an independent reviewer, and enjoying a more robust system of
parliamentary and judicial review for counterterrorism
legislation.231
Additionally, as of 2010, the Tory-Liberal Democrat coalition
government has made clear that it will try to curtail various
antiterrorism measures that were prone to abuse,232 giving rise to
231 Scholars have argued that the many layers of institutional review utilized
in the United Kingdom are not evident in the U.S. system because of a historical
reliance on separation of powers, but note that such reliance may be misplaced in
times of unified government. See DONOHUE, supra note 80, at 18–19 (explaining
the absence of independent oversight mechanisms in the United States); Daryl J.
Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2311, 2314–15 (2006) (detailing how the rise of political parties changed the
dynamics of separation of powers, and explaining that executive power
aggregates when the President and both houses of Congress are controlled by the
same political party).
232 See REVIEW OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SECURITY POWERS: REVIEW
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at 3 (recommending the repeal
or narrowing of various counterterrorism measures in order to “correct the
imbalance that has developed between the State’s security powers and civil
liberties, restoring those liberties wherever possible and focusing those powers
where necessary”); CONSERVATIVE-LIBERAL DEMOCRAT COALITION AGREEMENT
2010,
¶
10,
available
at
http://www.conservatives.com/~/media
/Files/Downloadable%20Files/agreement.ashx?dl=true
(noting
that
the
Agreement states that, among other goals, the coalition government will work
toward curtailing invasive and overreaching laws, and instituting “[s]afeguards
against the misuse of anti-terrorism legislation”); see also Queen Elizabeth II, Her
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the possibility that coalition-building between the political left—
interested in protecting civil liberties and reducing the
marginalization of outsider communities233—and the political
right—interested in cutting back on costly government programs
and lessening government involvement in the lives of private
citizens234—can lead to synergies in curtailing potential misuse and
abuse of national security powers.235
The United Kingdom has also set an example in the inclusion
sunset clauses in all antiterrorism legislation, even those that have
seemingly less controversial provisions such as definitions,236 and
requiring that the legislative committee must first review all of the

Majesty's most gracious speech to both Houses of Parliament on 25 May 2010
(May
25,
2010)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/queens-speech-2010-2/) (emphasizing the
need to repeal legislation that has compromised civil liberties).
233 See LIBERAL DEMOCRAT MANIFESTO 2010, at 94–95, (detailing a 2010
campaign platform by the Liberal Democrats noted that “the best way to combat
terrorism is to prosecute terrorists, not give away hard-won British freedoms”).
The manifesto promised four reforms in Britain’s security framework: (1) to
“[r]each out to the communities most at risk of radicalisation to improve the
relationships between them and the police and increase the flow of intelligence”;
(2) to eliminate “control orders, which can use secret evidence to place people
under house arrest”; (3) to “[r]educe the maximum period of pre-charge detention
to 14 days”; and (4) to “[m]ake it easier to prosecute and convict terrorists by
allowing intercept evidence in court and by making greater use of post-charge
questioning.” Id.
234 See INVITATION TO JOIN OUR GOVERNMENT: THE CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTO
2010, at 79. This 2010 campaign platform by the Conservatives argued that the
Labor government had “trampled on liberties and, in their place, compiled huge
databases to track the activities of millions of perfectly innocent people, giving
public bodies extraordinary powers to intervene in the way we live our lives.” Id.
Instead, the Conservatives suggested that new legislation be introduced to stop
“state encroachment,” “protect people from unwarranted intrusion by the state,”
and save money by cutting back on unnecessary security initiatives. Id.
235 See Henry Porter, A Tory-Lib Dem Coalition Offers Hope for Civil Liberties,
THE
GUARDIAN,
May
10,
2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/henryporter/2010/may/10/conser
vative-liberal-democrat-coalition-civil-liberties (noting that civil liberties was one
of a few areas in which Conservative and Liberal Democrat priorities were
aligned); see also David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548, 606,
617 (theorizing that national security policy may be better reasoned in nations
where political minorities take an active role in governance).
236 See John Ip, Sunset Clauses and Counterterrorism Legislation 3 (May 26,
2011)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1853945& (detailing the
history of U.K. sunset clauses in counterterrorism legislation).
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provisions of a statute, including definitions, and subsequently
renew the antiterrorism legislation.237
The appointment of an independent reviewer of
counterterrorism legislation offers further procedural protections
against abuse. Such a measure does not necessarily translate into
the curtailing of counterterrorism legislation—in fact, Lord Carlile
recommended that most elements of the legislative definition of
terrorism remain intact. However, the review process itself
provides some safeguard by assuring external, expert, apolitical
review of basic questions of national security and human rights.
Such review is not foreign to the United States—the review process
for designations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations under the
AEDPA exists to ensure accuracy and provide a procedural
safeguard against misuse. Adoption of a requirement for the
review of all counterterrorism legislation, including the
fundamental question of how terrorism is defined, would parallel
protections that we already recognize as necessary in some
counterterrorism contexts.
5.

CONCLUSION

The definitional creep occurring in these jurisdictions reflects
the problematic re-contextualization that seems almost endemic as
governments attempting to delineate the parameters of executive
power in national security matters. But because the definition of
terrorism is a threshold question that has widespread and
sometimes severe ramifications, we must be aware of the shifting
application of the definition and its historical roots. Only with
such an analysis can we consider whether the definition continues
to be appropriate in the larger calculus of national security, human
rights, legal protections for defendants, and rule of law
considerations.
Perhaps this definitional question, which in each nation seems
to have broadened and expanded its definition of terrorism238—not
237 BLICK, supra note 118, at 59–60 (recommending a review process that
encourages, at a minimum, a “public focus for debate”). But see DONOHUE, supra
note 80, at 339–40 (arguing that sunset provisions rarely provide a substantial
check on potential abuse, and suggesting that more robust reporting requirements
would be more useful).
238 Notably, these nations have not broadened the definitions of terrorism to
include state actors, a move in which a nation would potentially implicate itself
and its allies. See Sami Zeidan, Desperately Seeking Definition: The International
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just the police powers or sentencing guidelines that go along with
it, but the definition itself—with each major national security crisis,
also sheds some light onto why there continues to be so much
controversy at the international level as to the definition of
terrorism.
The stakes are extremely high and the application of the
definition seems to evolve without much consideration in the
legislative process as to the appropriateness of each application.
Instead, political pressures lead to the development of broad
definitions of terrorism as one means of constructing a strong
counterterrorism program.
Political pressure is a powerful
shaping mechanism on legislators and the executive, and can lead
to less self-policing and a decreased emphasis on safeguarding
civil rights and liberties in the process of defining terrorism and
applying the definition to individuals. As with many legislative or
executive decisions regarding national security and a high level of
politicization and emotional investment, the brunt of government
overreaching falls on politically unpopular and/or disenfranchised
minorities.
Courts have provided little check with regard to vagueness or
the scope of the application of the definition of terrorism, instead
of relying on a long-standing deference to the political branches in
matters of national security.239
As such, any rights protection based on concern of
overreaching and/or disparate impact on outsider communities
must come from legislative self-policing, such as that which has
occurred in the United Kingdom. Such self-policing, if it comes in
the form of a legislative appointment of an independent reviewing

Community’s Quest for Identifying the Specter of Terrorism, 36 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 491,
494–95 (2004) (arguing for inclusion of state-sponsored acts—such as the support
given to Osama bin Laden by the Taliban, or the support given by the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. to various revolutionary movements during the Cold War—in the
definition of terrorism).
239 Such judicial deference for foreign policy and war-making matters has a
long history in the United States. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944) (deferring to executive power in wartime and finding the internment of
all Japanese during wartime constitutional); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (finding that the legislative branch may grant
executive discretion in matters of foreign affairs); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863)
(finding that the executive branch had the power to impose a naval blockade
against secessionist states without prior approval from the legislative branch).
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body,240 would insulate politicians from the potential politically
damaging effects of such a review, and would provide a structural
core encouraging of impartiality and a deep level of review.
Of the nations compared here, the United Kingdom has made
the most promising assessment of the problems concomitant with a
broad domestic definition of terrorism, an international mandate to
pursue counterterrorism measures, and the human and civil rights
abuses that may occur as a result. In doing so, it has followed the
trajectory of the post-September 11 reaction of the United Nations
Security Council—moving from broad-based mandates to combat
terrorism to a more nuanced and even-handed approach that
values safeguards against human rights abuses.
The United States and India could and should do the same—
going beyond current efforts to pursue both security and rights,
and enacting laws that narrow the definition(s) of terrorism to suit
current needs, or justify current, or broader, definitions through
examination, consideration, and due weight given to the enormous
rights implications that ensue once the definition of terrorism is
found to apply.

240 In India, the Indian Law Commission, a non-partisan group of lawyers
and judges commissioned by the central government to offer advice and
proposals for legal reform, could serve as an independent reviewing body for
definitions of terrorism, as it has reviewed and proposed numerous pieces of
counterterrorism legislation. E.g., 173RD REPORT ON PREVENTION OF TERRORISM
BILL, supra note 219, § 30, 33.

